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Both management bias and measurement imprecision threaten the accurate reporting of 
complex accounting estimates. Actions by audit regulators and practitioners often place an 
imbalanced emphasis on the former. Although bias is an important concern, it is also necessary 
to consider how emphasizing risks arising from bias might impact auditors’ sensitivity to risks 
stemming from measurement imprecision. In an experimental economics setting, I find that 
auditor-participants generally exert a high level of effort when the risk of management bias is 
high. However, when the risk of bias is relatively low but auditors still face residual risks from 
imprecision, emphasizing risks related to bias leads auditors to “lower their guard” to a greater 
extent than when both bias and imprecision are emphasized. Accordingly, this study suggests 
that efforts intended to direct auditors’ attention towards management bias can come at the 
expense of auditor sensitivity to imprecision and result in insufficient audit effort when the risk 
of bias is low.  
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CHAPTER I  
Introduction 
 
 Auditors face significant challenges when evaluating complex accounting estimates (e.g., 
Griffith, Hammersley, and Kadous 2015a; Glover, Taylor, and Wu 2017). Prior research in 
accounting illuminates difficulties arising from technical aspects of auditing complex amounts 
and social challenges triggered by psychological mechanisms. This dissertation reviews and 
categorizes extant literature directed towards complex estimates, noting the importance of 
considering the implications of technical difficulties faced by auditors in light of social 
challenges. I also motivate and report the results of an experiment that investigates a potentially 
negative consequence of efforts by auditing regulators and practitioners to improve audit 
outcomes related to complex estimates by emphasizing risks arising from management bias.         
Both the potential for management bias and the presence of measurement imprecision 
threaten the accurate reporting of estimates. Recent developments in professional standards, 
regulatory inspections, and practitioner methodologies have emphasized the importance of 
auditors’ response to bias more than imprecision. Although mitigating management bias is 
critical for effective audits, this study examines the possibility that an imbalanced emphasis on 
risks related to bias could decrease auditors’ sensitivity to difficulties associated with 
measurement imprecision when the risk of bias is low.  
Management bias in complex estimates is an important concern for auditors. However, 
irrespective of whether an individual audit client poses a relatively high or low risk of bias, 
measurement imprecision presents an additional challenge that is pernicious in its own right. 
Christensen, Glover, and Wood (2012) and Cannon and Bedard (2016) provide evidence that the 
degree of uncertainty surrounding complex estimates frequently exceeds several multiples of 
audit materiality. Given the difficulties associated with estimating uncertain amounts (e.g., 
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Bratten, Jennings, and Schwab 2016), audit failures related to complex estimates can arise even 
in the absence of intentional bias. Indeed, a sizable majority of U.S. public companies that issue 
restatements do so for reasons unrelated to intentional bias or fraud (Posen 2007; Hennes, Leone, 
and Miller 2008), and Fang, Huang, and Wang (2017) find that the rate of unintentional 
misreporting increases as underlying complexity increases.  
Several factors present in the current audit environment elevate auditors’ attention to 
management bias, but do not similarly emphasize that measurement imprecision could also 
contribute to the risk of an undesirable audit outcome. A prime example of this imbalanced 
emphasis is mandatory fraud brainstorming (AICPA 2002), which directs auditors to consider 
the engagement-specific risk of intentional bias without providing a similar platform to consider 
other sources of risk. Specifically related to estimates, auditing standards frequently require 
auditors to consider the impact of bias on complex estimates, without specifying equivalent 
mandates for considering the effects of measurement imprecision (AICPA 2002; PCAOB 2010a, 
b). Regulatory inspections and firm methodologies often place similar emphasis on the risk of 
bias in complex estimates (PCAOB 2016; CAQ 2017). Because auditors can readily observe 
characteristics that contribute to differences in the relative risk of bias among different audit-
clients (e.g., the strength of internal controls or management integrity), it is important to consider 
whether emphasizing management bias can lead auditors to be insufficiently sensitive to 
measurement imprecision when the risk of bias is low. If so, overall audit quality could suffer.              
I develop theory that suggests an imbalanced emphasis on bias is likely to cause auditors 
to view the relative risk of bias as a simple decision rule for exerting audit effort. My interactive 
hypothesis predicts that attuning heuristically to the risk of bias will lead auditors to reduce 
costly audit effort, when the risk of bias is low, by more than what would be warranted given 
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continued risks from measurement imprecision. Such behavior is likely to reflect auditor 
decision processes that do not deliberatively, or systematically, incorporate the implications of 
measurement imprecision. By contrast, emphasizing the risk of bias and measurement 
imprecision is likely to mitigate insufficient audit effort when the risk of bias is low, and 
promote a more systematic decision-making approach whereby auditors more fully consider both 
sources of risk when approaching complex estimates.                   
To test this notion, I construct a contextually stark laboratory experiment, with 
undergraduate participants, that captures the monetary incentives and choices present in strategic 
interactions between auditors and reporters.1 Within participants, I manipulate the risk of 
management bias as high or low by varying whether or not reporters benefit economically from 
intentionally inflating an accounting estimate. Between participants, I manipulate whether 
auditors view reminders in the experimental materials that emphasize (1) risk related to 
management bias, or (2) risks arising from bias and measurement imprecision. Auditors mitigate 
exposure to the negative consequences of an audit failure – whether driven by bias or solely by 
imprecision – by exerting costly audit effort. To cleanly test the joint effect of the relative risk of 
bias and emphasis, I hold the magnitude of measurement imprecision constant across conditions. 
Importantly, participants in all conditions understand the implications that both management bias 
and measurement imprecision have for auditors’ and reporters’ payoff functions. Thus, the bias-
emphasis condition is akin to recent developments in the audit environment intended to heighten 
auditors’ sensitivity to management bias, while the dual-emphasis condition captures a more 
balanced emphasis on both sources of risk.   
                                                     
1 Throughout this paper, I use the terms manager and reporter interchangeably when referring to audit clients. 
Although auditors are typically thought of as interacting with client management, the term reporter connotes a more 
specific characterization of the client’s role in the context of a strategic interaction with auditors.    
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Results show an interactive effect of the two manipulated factors on auditors’ costly 
effort choices. When the estimate is likely to be biased, auditors exert a high level of effort 
regardless of whether the experimental materials emphasize management bias alone or both bias 
and imprecision. However, when the risk of bias is relatively low, auditors in the condition 
emphasizing only management bias reduce effort to a greater extent than auditors exposed to an 
emphasis on bias and imprecision. Lower effort in the bias-emphasis condition, when the risk of 
bias is low, results in a significantly less optimal allocation of audit resources.2 This effect 
appears to be subconscious, as auditors assess similar overall risk levels across emphasis 
conditions, yet they make different effort decisions. Supplemental analysis supports the notion 
that, consistent with theory, an imbalanced emphasis on bias leads auditors to rely heuristically 
on the presence or absence of bias when choosing a level of costly audit effort. By contrast, a 
more balanced emphasis on both bias and imprecision results in a more systematic decision-
making process.  
Beyond auditors’ decisions, the results from my experiment offer insight into reporter 
behavior surrounding complex accounting estimates. Predictably, reporters incentivized to be 
biased exhibit substantial bias. However, I find that even reporters with financial incentives to 
provide an unbiased estimate exhibit some degree of upward reporting bias that reflects their 
preference for more favorable realizations of the estimated amount. That is, akin to Hales’ (2007) 
study involving investors’ propensity to engage in “motivated reasoning,” I find that reporters’ 
preferences have a modest influence on their estimates, despite financial incentives to be 
                                                     
2 As described in more detail below, optimal behavior is assessed in relation to auditors’ payoff function as defined 
in my abstract game. While my setting does not incorporate participants in roles akin to investors or regulators, 
auditors’ incentive function does capture the conventional demands of such stakeholders in a context analogous to 
auditing complex estimates. Namely, auditors generally expect, and are expected, to exert a high level of effort to 
obtain adequate assurance over estimates (e.g., Griffith et al. 2015a, Glover et al. 2017). 
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unbiased. From purely a financial reporting perspective, this result speaks to difficulties 
associated with preventing managers’ unintentional biases from impacting their reporting of 
subjective amounts. From an auditing standpoint, this finding underscores the importance of 
mitigating the potential for under-auditing when the risk of bias appears to be relatively low.  
Reflecting the reality that bias is an important concern, prior auditing research documents 
ways to improve auditors’ response to bias in complex estimates (e.g., Griffith, Hammersley, 
Kadous, and Young 2015b; Rasso 2015). However, auditors are responsible for responding to 
risk from both intentional and unintentional sources. My study indicates that efforts by auditing 
standard setters, regulatory inspectors, and practitioners to increase auditor sensitivity to 
management bias in complex estimates can come at the expense of inadequate auditor attention 
to measurement imprecision. That a more balanced emphasis on bias and imprecision mitigates 
this deficiency in auditor judgment suggests a potential avenue for improving current auditing 
standards, the focus of inspections, and prescribed audit methodologies. As a practical example, 
my results suggest that overall audit quality would likely benefit from augmenting fraud 
brainstorming sessions with discussions regarding the risks posed by other significant sources of 
risk. 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter II reviews, 
categorizes, and discusses prior literature related to auditing complex estimates. Chapter III 
provides institutional background, develops theory, and presents my study’s hypothesis. Chapter 
IV describes my research method. Chapter V presents results, and Chapter VI concludes.  
  
6 
 
CHAPTER II  
Technical and Social Challenges of Auditing Complex Accounting Estimates 
 
 Providing assurance over complex accounting estimates connotes both technical and 
social challenges for auditors. This chapter reviews prior research in an effort to more clearly 
differentiate between these two classifications of the potential drivers of deficient audit 
judgments. While auditing research has long specified a link between uncertainty and diminished 
audit quality, only recently have scholars begun to focus specifically on complex accounting 
estimates. One prominent set of studies specifically examines technical challenges incumbent to 
auditing complex estimates. Other researchers have devoted more attention towards social, or 
psychologically based, difficulties arising from estimates.  
While both streams of research provide unique strengths and insights, understanding the 
distinctions between technical and social challenges is important because focusing on one or the 
other provides an incomplete picture of the difficulties surrounding audits of complex estimates. 
Insofar as deficiencies in audit judgements can be caused by both technical and social 
challenges, potential remedies suggested by research findings may be at least partially ineffective 
if they address only one class of difficulty, but not the other. To fully evaluate proposed solutions 
to the challenges of auditing complex estimates, it is important to consider both the technical and 
social implications of solutions.  
This chapter contributes to the literature on complex accounting estimates by 1) explicitly 
distinguishing between technical and social, or psychologically based, challenges stemming from 
audits of complex estimates, and 2) suggesting a framework to facilitate more intentional 
consideration of the unique implications of the two classes of difficulty. Greater attention by 
regulators, practitioners, and scholars to the distinctions between technical and social difficulties 
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can help identify policies, audit procedures, and avenues for future research that more 
completely address the challenges of providing assurance over complex accounting estimates.   
Uncertainty and Audit Quality 
 Although not specifically focused on complex accounting estimates, a stream of literature 
published around the turn of the century speaks to the effect of uncertainty on audit outcomes.3 
Wright and Wright (1997) examine several factors that have potential to influence auditors’ 
decisions to waive an audit adjustment. Utilizing data taken from the working papers of actual 
audit engagements, Wright and Wright (1997) regress whether or not a proposed audit 
adjustment is waived on the adjustment’s materiality level, effect on income, client-specific 
factors, and, notably, subjectivity. Wright and Wright (1997) define subjectivity as uncertainty 
regarding either the appropriate accounting treatment, or uncertainty regarding the effect of an 
unknown future event on the accuracy of a reporting choice. Results indicate that auditors are 
significantly more likely to waive subjective adjustments. Braun (2001) conducts an experiment 
to corroborate and extend the themes illuminated by Wright and Wright (1997). She also finds 
that potential audit adjustments related to relatively subjective or uncertain amounts are less 
likely to be booked.  
 Libby and Kinney (2000) report results from two experiments suggesting that auditors are 
less likely to correct an overstatement if the adjustment would cause the company to miss 
forecasted earnings. In Experiment 1, the overstatement stems from the allowance for inventory 
obsolescence, an amount estimated by management. In Experiment 2, the overstatement results 
from an objectively observable inadvertent duplication of counts related to ending inventory. 
                                                     
3 For this discussion, uncertainty can be loosely conceptualized as resulting from imperfect information about an 
accounting number. In the following chapter, I provide more precise definitions of related constructs as they pertain 
to the particular experiment reported in this dissertation.    
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Comparing the study’s two experiments suggests that misstatements surrounding the more 
uncertain allowance account are less likely to be corrected than misstatements stemming from 
the more objectively measured inventory account. 
  Mayhew, Schatzberg, and Sevcik (2001) operationalize laboratory markets to directly 
examine the implications of accounting uncertainty for audit quality. In a setting where manager-
participants make representations about the value of an asset, auditor-participants attest to 
managements’ representations, and investor-participants bid for the asset, Mayhew et al. (2001) 
find that uncertainty increases auditors’ propensity to agree with managements’ assertions 
despite audit evidence to the contrary. Given the presence of negative financial consequences 
that arise when auditors develop reputations for impaired objectivity, this study speaks to the 
power of uncertainty in promoting acquiescence to client preferences.   
 Collectively, Wright and Wright (1997), Braun (2001), Libby and Kinney (2000), and 
Mayhew et al. (2001) provide an important backdrop for more recent research specifically 
focused on complex accounting estimates. These early studies document that the presence of 
uncertainty generally undermines audit quality by reducing the likelihood auditors require 
correction of misstated amounts. However, the above studies stop short of specifying a 
substantive theoretical basis for the effect of uncertainty other than to cite intuition that 
uncertainty reduces auditors’ leverage when imposing an adjustment (e.g., Deis and Giroux 
1992) or diminishes auditors’ ability to agree on the appropriate accounting treatment (e.g., 
Magee and Tseng 1990).  
The increased prominence of accounting estimates has spurred a growing interest in audit 
issues related to uncertain amounts. As a result, more recent studies build on this prior literature 
linking uncertainty to diminished audit quality by identifying specific difficulties made acute by 
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uncertain accounting estimates. To date, scholars’ efforts have generally been directed towards 
either technical or social challenges arising from audits of complex estimates.  
Technical Challenges of Auditing Complex Estimates  
Audit deficiencies identified in PCAOB inspection reports attest to the difficulty of 
providing assurance over complex estimates (e.g., PCAOB 2016). In an attempt to explain such 
challenges, Bratten et al. (2013) provide a thorough review of accounting literature relevant to 
auditors’ approach to accounting estimates. Drawing on the theoretical research framework 
specified by Bonner (2008), Bratten et al. (2013) specify three categories of factors that affect 
the audit of estimates: environmental factors, task factors, and auditor-specific factors. 
Environmental factors include uncertainty, regulatory and legal considerations, and actions taken 
by the audit client or external valuation specialists. Task factors refer to the complexities and 
nuances of actually performing audit procedures over accounting estimates. Bratten et al. (2013) 
specifically highlight opportunities and incentives for management bias as a task factor 
contributing to difficulties underlying audits of estimates. Auditor-specific factors include 
auditor knowledge, expertise, and application of professional skepticism.4 Bratten et al. (2013) 
note that these factors can interact within and between categories to impact auditor judgments, 
and offer suggestions for future research falling at the intersection multiple factors.  
Broadly speaking, the factors identified by Bratten et al. (2013) represent difficulties 
stemming from technical aspects of auditing estimates. This theme is echoed by several other 
studies specifically addressing complex accounting estimates. Christensen et al. (2012) are 
                                                     
4 While this category appears closest to what I describe as the social challenges of auditing complex estimates, 
deficiencies in auditor expertise or professional skepticism are not necessarily made manifest due to psychological 
mechanisms or biases. That is, one takeaway from Bratten et al. (2013) is that the complex and uncertain nature of 
auditing complex estimates is sufficient to expose inherent limitations in audit-specific factors even without 
psychological or social factors necessarily playing a role in deficient audit judgments.  
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among the first to attempt to quantify the magnitude of estimation uncertainty present in fair 
value estimates and the sensitivity of estimated amounts to changes in underlying assumptions. 
Christensen et al. (2012) use anecdotal, but representative, examples to demonstrate that very 
small changes (within a “reasonable range”) to fair value inputs and assumptions often result in 
very large changes (up to 50 times larger than conventional audit materiality thresholds) to 
reported amounts. 
Christensen et al. (2012) suggest that the demands of providing positive assurance over 
complex estimates are often likely to exceed the reasonable capabilities of audit professionals. 
As a result, the authors suggest that regulators could consider holding auditors to a different 
standard for amounts with extreme uncertainty. Additionally, Christensen et al. (2012) advocate 
for increased disclosures, and/or changes to the audit report, that would serve to provide financial 
statement users with more context regarding the magnitude of uncertainty surrounding estimates 
and limitations in auditors’ ability to provide assurance over these amounts.   
Cannon and Bedard (2017) utilize a questionnaire distributed to experienced audit 
personnel to corroborate the extreme magnitude of uncertainty surrounding complex estimates 
and provide further insights into the process and outcomes of auditing these amounts. Cannon 
and Bedard’s (2017) respondents report that the range of estimates’ uncertainty frequently 
exceeds specified materiality thresholds (72% of engagements, with 21% of engagements over 
five times materiality). Consistent with a strong link between uncertainty and technical difficulty, 
Cannon and Bedard’s (2017) results suggest that auditors associate higher levels of risk with 
higher levels of uncertainty. Higher levels of assessed risk are associated with a higher likelihood 
that auditors deem necessary the use of a valuation specialist to provide assistance in obtaining 
assurance over estimates. However, Cannon and Bedard (2017) find that neither the extent of 
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uncertainty, nor auditors’ risk assessments, have a direct effect on whether proposed audit 
adjustments are ultimately booked. The authors interpret this finding as reflecting the technical 
difficulty auditors have in justifying, negotiating, and implementing auditor-proposed 
adjustments of uncertain amounts. As a potential remedy, Cannon and Bedard (2017) suggest 
that specialists can be used to bolster the strength and credibility of evidence auditors present to 
management when negotiating adjustments.  
Griffith et al. (2015a) conduct interviews with experienced auditors to provide a 
descriptive account of the challenges encountered, and procedures employed, when auditing 
complex estimates. The authors also provide a theory-based analysis of the causes of these 
difficulties. A key implication of Griffith et al. (2015a) is that characteristics of the audit 
methods endorsed by regulators and employed by firms represent an important driver of 
deficiencies in auditor judgment. For example, auditors tend to verify inputs provided by 
managers, whereas independently evaluating inputs would appear to facilitate a more rigorous 
assessment of estimates. Griffith et al. (2015a) also find that the effectiveness of auditors’ 
attempts to overcome a lack of knowledge and expertise through the use of valuation specialists 
is often limited by coordination challenges and a lack of common vocabulary.  The authors argue 
that alterations to these institutional features offer opportunities to improve audit outcomes 
related to complex accounting estimates.  
Glover et al.’s (2017) survey covers many of the same themes as Cannon and Bedard 
(2017) and Griffith et al. (2015a) but extends both studies on a number of dimensions. Glover et 
al. (2017) provide insight regarding different procedures utilized for “highly challenging” versus 
“typical” complex estimates. The authors distinguish between financial and nonfinancial 
estimates and discuss technical challenges stemming from auditors’ use of specialists. For 
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instance, third-party pricing services often do not share proprietary information necessary for 
auditors to evaluate amounts obtained from such providers. Glover et al.’s (2017) respondents 
also note a general lack of valuation knowledge on the part of both management and auditors.  
The authors’ chief conclusion is that standard-setters could clarify audit requirements, especially 
as they pertain to nonfinancial estimates.    
Glover, Taylor, and Wu (2016) focus on an expectations gap between auditors and 
regulators, particularly PCAOB inspectors. Glover et al.’s (2016) qualitative data suggest that 
audit partners perceive the technical difficulty surrounding complex estimates as affecting not 
just judgments and evaluations made by auditors, but also regulators. As a result, issues flagged 
by inspectors are not always normative audit deficiencies, but can stem from differences of 
opinion between regulators and practitioners. Glover et al. (2016) draw on psychology theory 
related to expertise to provide insight on factors that might explain differences of opinion 
between two experts (i.e., auditors and regulators) performing their respective duties in a 
competent manner. Glover et al. (2016) make two broad observations: 1) hindsight bias makes 
uncertain amounts susceptible to “second guessing” by regulators, and 2) auditors and regulators 
have different expectations regarding the inspection process. As a result, regulatory inspections 
can have the effect of shifting auditors’ focus from audit risk to “inspection risk.” Glover et al. 
(2016) suggest that the different stakeholders in the profession work together to clarify 
inspectors’ expectations, and increase overall expertise regarding complex estimates.   
In sum, the stream of research reviewed above has done much to advance auditors’, 
regulators’, and scholars’ understanding of technical challenges related to auditing complex 
estimates. While insightful, the above studies stop short of investigating how social dynamics 
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extraneous to the technical difficulty of auditing complex estimates might result in undesirable 
audit outcomes.     
Social Challenges of Auditing Complex Estimates 
 Although several experiments have examined important audit-related issues in settings 
that are characterized by uncertainty (e.g., Hackenbrack and Nelson 1996; Salterio and Koonce 
1997; Kadous, Kennedy, and Peecher 2003; Bauer 2015), only recently have researchers begun 
to explicitly focus on social, or psychologically based, implications of auditing complex 
estimates. This growing steam of mostly experimental research provides an important 
supplementary perspective to more descriptive studies focusing on technical challenges. As 
discussed below, the experiment motived and reported in this dissertation is meant to contribute 
to the consideration of these social challenges of auditing complex estimates. 
 Griffin (2014) examines how different aspects of uncertainty specific to accounting 
estimates – subjectivity and imprecision – influence auditor judgment. In an experiment with 
practicing auditors, participants review information about a fair value estimate and determine the 
likelihood, and amount, of an audit adjustment. Griffin (2014) manipulates three variables: the 
subjectivity of inputs used in forming the estimate, the estimate’s imprecision (i.e., range of 
possible values), and the presence or absence of a supplemental footnote disclosure that 
discusses the estimation process and range of possible values. He finds that the joint effect of 
high levels of both subjectivity and imprecision increases the likelihood auditors require an 
adjustment to a complex estimate, while the amount of the required adjustment increases only as 
imprecision increases. However, adjustment decisions are unaffected by the estimates’ 
subjectivity or imprecision when management provides a supplemental footnote disclosure. That 
is, supplemental disclosures regarding uncertainty appear to mitigate the effect of other 
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seemingly important factors – estimate subjectivity and imprecision – in determining the extent 
of an audit adjustment. The implication of these results, consistent with psychology theory 
related to moral licensing (e.g., Cain, Loewenstein, and Moore 2011), is that auditors assume less 
responsibility for a possible misstatement when additional disclosures are present. 
Emett, Libby, and Nelson (2016) examine auditors’ corrective actions and assessments of 
management bias related to a portfolio of accounting estimates. In an experiment, experienced 
auditors evaluate a portfolio comprising several Level 2 fair market value securities. Auditors 
view information about client-reported values and a best estimate determined by the audit team. 
The distribution of differences between client-reported values and the audit team’s estimate for 
the individual securities within the portfolio varies by condition, but the portfolios’ total 
aggregate overstatement is held constant. The authors operationalize these varying misstatement 
distributions along two dimensions: overstatement frequency and magnitude. In essence, Emett 
et al. (2016) abstract away from the technical difficulties of determining whether uncertain 
estimates are misstated to examine the potential for social challenges triggered by different 
patterns in discrepancies between reported amounts and the auditors’ best estimates. 
Emett et al. (2016) find that auditors mechanically apply current auditing standards 
defining a misstatement as the difference between the auditor’s best estimate and the nearest 
endpoint of a reasonable range (PCAOB 2010a). As a result, the distribution of misstatement 
across individual estimates within a portfolio leads to predictable differences in the amount of 
total overstatement corrected. One implication of this finding is that auditing standards could be 
modified to define a misstatement as the difference between the auditor’s estimate and the 
reported value, not the endpoint of a reasonable range. Such a revision would mitigate variation 
in audit adjustments driven by mechanical differences in the way misstatements are spread 
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across a portfolio of estimated amounts. Emett et al. (2016) also draw on behavioral theory to 
predict and find that auditors are likely to perceive more bias in portfolios with a high proportion 
of relatively small overstatements, or portfolios with overstatements that represent a relatively 
large percentage of the underlying securities’ book values. In sum, Emett et al. (2016) 
demonstrate that social factors, unrelated to technical difficulties posed by auditing complex 
estimates, lead to variation in audit adjustment decisions and assessments of management bias.    
 Three studies draw on psychology theories to experimentally examine how auditors’ 
mindsets can shape the evaluation of complex accounting estimates. Griffith et al. (2015b) 
experimentally administer a simple intervention that prompts auditor-participants to assume 
either a deliberative or implemental mindset. Results suggest that a deliberative mindset 
enhances skepticism applied towards biased estimates. In an application of Griffith et al.’s 
(2015b) findings, Tegeler (2017) experimentally investigates how the focus of PCAOB 
inspectors can shape auditor mindsets. She finds that when inspectors focus on audit judgment-
quality, versus audit procedures, a deliberative mindset – and improved audit judgments – is 
more likely. Rasso’s (2015) experiment examines how audit documentation instructions can 
promote different mindsets. Drawing on Construal Level Theory (e.g., Trope and Liberman 
2003), documentation instructions designed to encourage auditors to focus on “the big picture” 
improves auditor judgments, actions, and application of skepticism. Collectively, Griffith et al. 
(2015b), Tegeler (2017), and Rasso (2015) suggest that, holding technical difficulties constant, 
subtle differences in the way auditors mentally approach estimates have meaningful implications 
for audit outcomes. 
Somewhat akin to Rasso (2015), three studies delve into social implications stemming 
from the framing of prescribed audit methodology. Austin, Hammersley, and Ricci (2016) 
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predict and find that audit documentation instructions specifically directing auditors to document 
evidence inconsistent with managements’ preferences can improve auditors’ overall 
interpretation of evidence related to a biased complex estimate. Cohen, Gaynor, Montague, and 
Wayne (2016) find that audit guidance framed in a way that directs auditors to “support and 
oppose” managements’ assumptions results in higher assessments of misstatement risk and a 
more balanced search for, and evaluation of, evidence. Maksymov, Nelson, and Kinney (2017) 
similarly find that framing auditing standards in a way that directs auditors to assess why 
managements’ assumptions are not appropriate increases budgeted time for audit tasks. In sum, 
these three studies imply that, beyond the technical requirements of standards, the framing of 
audit directives can trigger a psychological response from auditors and variation in audit 
outcomes related to complex estimates.  
Several studies are relevant to social issues arising from auditors’ use of specialists. 
Griffith (2016a) reports qualitative results from interviews with auditors and in-firm valuation 
specialists that attest to many of the technical difficulties enumerated above. However, Griffith 
(2016a) also draws on psychology theory regarding trust to provide insight into how auditors 
may view specialists as a threat to auditors’ jurisdictional claim, and thereby fail to make 
effective use of specialists’ knowledge and expertise. Similarly, Griffith (2016b) reports the 
results of experiments that test how motivational factors related to the presentation of specialists’ 
work and auditor sensitivity to risk can influence auditors’ judgments concerning complex 
accounting estimates. Focusing on specialists’ judgments, Bauer, Estep, and Griffith (2017) 
explore a related theme in an experiment examining specialists’ psychological ownership of an 
issue related to an accounting estimate. They find that a higher level of psychological ownership 
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leads specialists to employ cognition and judgment consistent with more desirable audit 
outcomes. 
Regarding client-hired valuation specialists, Joe, Vandervelde, and Wu (2017) 
acknowledge psychological reasons for how the degree of quantification auditors’ observe in 
specialist-prepared reports can shape the nature and extent of planned testing surrounding 
complex estimates. The authors find that in high risk scenarios, auditors tend to pay less attention 
to subjective valuation inputs if specialists’ reports contain a high degree of quantification. 
Because subjective inputs are highly susceptible to management bias, Joe et al. (2017) illustrate a 
situation where social dynamics are likely to increase the likelihood of an undesirable audit 
outcome. Pyzoha, Taylor, and Wu (2016) also examine how auditors respond to client-hired 
specialists. The authors manipulate audit firm tone-at-the-top and find that that, ceteris paribus, 
auditors tend to over rely on client-hired specialists when firm leadership stresses performance 
goals rather than audit quality.  
Kachelmeier and Van Landuyt (2017) document an interaction between measurement 
uncertainty and seemingly innocuous, casual social bonds likely to arise between auditors and 
clients. The authors find that the effects of uncertainty and auditor-client social bonds are 
interdependent. In isolation, neither construct solely drives auditor leniency towards the client, 
but together, uncertainty and social bonds prompt auditors to give clients the “benefit of the 
doubt,” despite evidence suggesting that corrective action is warranted. One implication of this 
result is that specialists and other non-client facing members of the engagement team are likely 
to provide more dispassionate judgments given the relative lack of opportunity to form casual 
social bonds with client personnel. 
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Finally, the experiment reported in this dissertation is based on behavioral arguments for 
how focusing on management bias can sometimes be detrimental to overall audit quality. I find 
that when environmental factors place an imbalanced emphasis on bias, auditors are less 
sensitive to risks related to measurement imprecision, another important risk factor surrounding 
complex estimates. This deficiency in auditor judgment causes insufficient audit effort when the 
risk of bias is low. Like the other socially directed studies reviewed above, my experiment 
reveals psychologically based challenges distinct from the technical difficulty of auditing 
complex estimates.     
A Framework for Considering Challenges Related to Auditing Complex Estimates 
 Broadly speaking, the above review suggests that studies focusing on technical versus 
social challenges of providing assurance over complex estimates typically take different 
approaches. Scholars focused on technical challenges tend to employ more descriptive, survey-
based, and qualitative methods. Researchers investigating social challenges are more likely to 
utilize laboratory experiments rooted in psychology and economic theories. While both 
approaches certainly offer unique strengths valuable for answering individual studies’ particular 
research questions, the results and implications of these separate streams should not be viewed in 
isolation.  
Prior research on technical challenges often seems to implicitly assume that auditors are 
rational agents, but that environmental or task factors external to the auditor, or internal factors 
like limited capacity and capability, restrict the ideal fulfillment of the audit function. On the 
other hand, studies focused on social challenges can seem to implicitly assume that auditors have 
potentially unlimited capability to adequately discharge their duties, but are subject to 
psychologically based judgment biases or other faults and foibles of human nature. Intuitively, 
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deficiencies in audit outcomes surrounding complex accounting estimates likely reflect both 
points of view: environmental, task, and auditor-specific factors limit the capability of auditors 
predisposed to behave in biased, boundedly rational ways.  
It follows that a fuller understanding of the implications of recent research related to 
complex estimates can be gained from considering technical challenges in light of social 
challenges, and vice-versa. To facilitate a more complete picture of auditing complex estimates, I 
propose a framework to 1) assist in the simultaneous consideration of technical and social 
challenges and 2) guide future research to fill in the gaps in our current understanding by 
identifying additional challenges and solutions. The framework, detailed in Figure 1, is based on 
the three categories of factors that affect the audit of estimates specified by Bratten et al. (2013): 
environmental factors, task factors, and auditor-specific factors. Within each category, I list 
specific factors identified by Bratten et al. (2013). Drawing on the papers review above, I then 
identify specific challenges and remedies that correspond to each factor, categorizing each as 
technical or social. 
 Several insights emerge from this framework. Generally speaking, the following 
discussion speaks to the importance of viewing technical and social challenges of complex 
estimates in light of one another. Socially directed studies can often enhance or expand the 
findings of studies focused on technical challenges. For example, Cannon and Bedard (2017) 
argue that justifying, negotiating, and implementing adjustments to estimates is technically 
difficult for auditors. However, Kachelmeier and Van Landuyt (2017) suggest a social cause that 
likely contributes to Cannon and Bedard’s (2017) finding: auditors give clients the “benefit of 
the doubt” in the presence of uncertainty and casual social bonds.  
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In other cases, seemingly logical responses to technical challenges can sometimes create 
new social challenges by triggering psychological judgment biases. For example, Christensen et 
al. (2012) and Glover et al. (2017) call for increased disclosure regarding the magnitude of 
uncertainty surrounding estimates and limitations in assurance provided by auditors. However, 
Griffin (2014) indicates that such an initiative would likely be detrimental to audit quality as 
auditors respond to increased disclosures as a license to assume less responsibility for possible 
misstatements. Future research could examine the extent to which benefits to financial statement 
users of more disclosure surrounding complex estimates are offset by Griffin’s (2014) finding 
that increased disclosures result in a lower propensity for auditors to correct misstatement 
amounts.5  
Researchers have devoted substantial attention to auditors’ use of valuation specialists. 
While specialists’ technical knowledge and expertise appears necessary for evaluating many 
complex estimates given shortcomings on the part of auditors and management, auditors’ 
utilization of specialists is not without friction. Studies focused on technical (Griffith et al. 
2015a; Cannon and Bedard 2017; Glover et al. 2017) and social (Griffith 2016a, b; Bauer et al. 
2017; Joe et al. 2017; Pyzoha et al. 2016) challenges have identified both benefits and 
complications from using specialists. However, review of the framework reveals that extant 
research has yet to clearly specify situations when potential benefits of using specialists (e.g., 
Kachelmeier and Van Landuyt 2017) do or do not outweigh any drawbacks (e.g., Griffith 
2016a). 
                                                     
5 Although not directly related to auditor judgements, Majors (2016) provides a counterpoint to the potential costs of 
additional disclosure implied by Griffin (2014) with an experiment that demonstrates how range disclosure can 
constrain aggressive reporting, especially for individuals with personalities associated with a higher propensity for 
aggressive reporting. 
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Scholars focused on technical challenges tend to make arguments about the broad nature 
of standards governing complex accounting estimates. For example, Christensen et al. (2012) 
question whether different levels of assurance, or even negative rather than positive assurance, 
would be a more reasonable standard for audits of complex estimates. Griffith et al. (2015a) note 
that auditor judgments could be improved by utilizing an evaluation, versus verification, 
approach to estimates. Glover et al. 2017 go so far as to suggest that regulators consider “when, 
if at all, auditors should use management’s assumptions when developing independent estimates” 
(81). Studies examining social challenges add the important insight that beyond the content of 
auditing standards and guidance, the framing of such directives is an important determinant of 
audit outcomes (Austin et al. 2016; Cohen et al. 2016; Maksymov et al. 2017). 
Directly relevant to the experiment described in this dissertation, studies focused on the 
technical challenges of complex estimates acknowledge the high risk of management bias and 
suggest the importance of auditor attention to the potential for bias (e.g., Bratten et al. 2013; 
Griffith et al. 2015a). However, the results described in Chapter IV suggest that an imbalanced 
emphasis on bias can leave auditors exposed to risks stemming from measurement imprecision 
when the risk of bias is low. I suggest that a more balanced emphasis on bias and imprecision is 
important for ensuring diligent audit effort is directed towards complex estimates. 
To effectively overcome both technical and social challenges of auditing estimates, it is 
important to consider each class of difficulty within the context of the other. The first step in 
doing so is the clearly differentiate between technical and social challenges. The review and 
framework above provides a structure for identifying and assessing technical and social 
challenges related to complex estimates. By applying a thorough and systematic approach to 
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these difficulties, future researchers can identify more challenges and, importantly, more 
effective responses. 
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CHAPTER III  
Institutional Background, Theory, and Hypothesis 
Measurement Imprecision 
 Measurement imprecision is inherent to complex accounting estimates. Broadly speaking, 
this construct captures characteristics of a reported amount that inhibit the precise observation of 
the amount’s true value. For example, measurement imprecision can be driven by uncertainty 
(e.g., Christensen et al. 2012; Cannon and Bedard 2016), subjectivity (e.g., Braun 2001; Griffin 
2014), or complexity (e.g., Bratten et al. 2016; Fang et al. 2017). A high level of measurement 
imprecision demands a high level of audit effort in response (Griffith et al. 2015a; Glover et al. 
2017). 
Barring outright fraud, the extent of potential management bias is determined by the 
magnitude of measurement imprecision. That it, imprecision facilitates bias in that it provides 
leeway in financial reporting (e.g., Lundholm 1999). Regardless, even in the absence of bias, 
measurement imprecision creates the possibility of (unintentional) misreporting. As described 
later, my study mitigates this natural confound between bias and imprecision by treating 
imprecision as a constant. Consistent with the context of auditing complex estimates, I assume 
imprecision is large in magnitude, thus giving rise to a significant source of risk.   
Institutional Emphasis on Management Bias 
 Recent developments in the current audit environment have emphasized auditors’ 
responsibility to consider and respond to risks arising from management bias and fraud. In this 
subsection, I outline prominent factors contributing to this institutional emphasis that directly 
impact audits of complex accounting estimates. 
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Professional Auditing Standards 
Following several high-profile accounting scandals in the early 2000s, guarding against 
fraud has become a higher priority for standard setters and the audit profession (e.g., AICPA 
2002). In line with this shift, professional auditing standards often place a skewed emphasis on 
risks arising from bias, relative to measurement imprecision, when discussing complex 
accounting estimates. SAS 99 (AICPA 2002) contains an extensive discussion of estimates’ 
susceptibility to intentional bias (paragraph 54) and specific directives for auditors to review 
accounting estimates for bias (paragraphs 63-65). The only mention in SAS 99 of concepts 
underlying measurement imprecision is in relation to how imprecision creates or elevates the risk 
of bias, not how imprecision might result in misreporting regardless of management bias. 
Similarly, AS 2110 “Identifying and Assessing Risks of Material Misstatement” identifies 
accounting estimates as an area where management might manipulate the financial statements 
(e.g., paragraph 05; PCAOB 2010b), but does not specifically link estimates to risks arising from 
imprecision.  Likewise, AS 2810 “Evaluating Audit Results” contains a paragraph (27) requiring 
explicit consideration of the potential for bias in accounting estimates, but does not reference the 
impact of estimates’ imprecision on misstatement risk (PCAOB 2010a).    
More generally, a notable aspect of SAS 99 is its mandate for “fraud brainstorming” 
meetings during the planning phase of every audit. Fraud brainstorming involves the entire audit 
team and is intended to facilitate explicit identification and communication of engagement-
specific factors impacting the likelihood of management bias and fraud. Brazel, Carpenter, and 
Jenkins (2010) document a link between high-quality instances of fraud brainstorming sessions 
and auditor response to fraud risks. Risk factors distinct from bias, however, are not afforded 
similar platforms to attract auditor attention. Given that standards identify complex estimates as 
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particularly susceptible to management bias, fraud brainstorming sessions represent a likely 
opportunity for engagement teams to explicitly articulate the specific risk of an individual audit 
client exhibiting bias in estimates.  
Emphasis notwithstanding, professional auditing standards certainly do not ignore the 
implications of measurement imprecision. PCAOB Auditing Standards 2501 and 2502 (formerly 
classified as Interim Standards AU 342 and 328) are the primary standards specifically 
addressing accounting estimates that govern auditors of U.S. publicly traded companies (PCAOB 
2003a, b).6 AS 2501, 2502, and AU-C 540 (the AICPA’s equivalent standard) contain 
substantive discussions regarding the relationship between higher levels of complexity, 
subjectivity, or uncertainty and a higher risk that estimates are misstated. However, these 
standards also prominently discuss risks arising from bias, while the standards described above 
exclusively highlight management bias when discussing estimates, thus conveying a decidedly 
imbalanced emphasis. 
Further, the evolution of current standards suggests that regulators are increasing the 
emphasis placed on auditors’ responsibility to consider the potential impact of management bias 
on accounting estimates and subjective amounts. The AICPA’s AU-C 540 (AICPA 2012) 
replaced AU 342 and 328 (AICPA 1989; 2003) for audits of private companies. A comparison of 
the more current language used in AU-C 540 to language in the superseded standards is 
informative regarding this trend.7 As a coarse indicator, AU 342 and 328 use the word “bias” a 
                                                     
6 PCAOB Interim Standards AU 342 and 328 were adopted from existing AICPA standards upon formation of the 
PCAOB under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Effective December 31, 2016, PCAOB standards were reorganized 
with AU 342 and 328 becoming AS 2501 and 2502, respectively. The reorganization, which also affected other 
standards referenced in this subsection, did not substantively alter the contents of the standards. As mentioned 
below, the PCAOB and IAASB are both in the process of developing new comprehensive standards related to 
auditing complex estimates. 
7 Although AU-C 540 ostensibly “does not change or expand [the] superseded AU sections in any significant 
respect,” new language was adopted for the standard (AICPA 2014, 9). ISA 540, which mirrors AU-C 540 almost 
verbatim, provides guidance for auditors under purview of international standards (IFAC 2008). 
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combined three times, while AU-C 540 mentions “bias” 29 times. The newer standard alerts 
auditors to management bias in its first paragraph (AU 342 first mentions bias in paragraph 4, 
AU 328 in paragraph 33) and contains several developed subsections and paragraphs (not present 
in the superseded standards) discussing risks arising from management bias.  
An evaluation of the relative emphasis on bias versus imprecision conveyed by 
professional standards is inherently subjective. Regardless, when considering the broad scope of 
auditing standards reviewed above, risks arising from possible management bias consistently 
appear as a substantial and growing point of emphasis. This emphasis on bias is rarely 
accompanied by an equivalent emphasis on risks arising from measurement imprecision. Further, 
the PCAOB and the IAASB are currently in the process of considering extensive revisions to 
existing standards specifically addressing complex accounting estimates (PCAOB 2014; IAASB 
2016), and have identified this process as an opportunity to implement even “more robust 
requirements” related to “consideration of indicators of management bias” (IAASB 2016, 7).  
It is important to note that such efforts to increase auditors’ attention to bias are not 
necessarily misguided. Bias is a significant source of risk threatening complex estimates and the 
possibility exists that auditors have previously not given bias sufficient consideration. 
Regardless, my premise is that emphasizing bias in a manner that sets it apart from imprecision 
(e.g., as seen in directives contained in SAS 99, including fraud brainstorming, AS 2110, AS 
2810, and projected trends in standard setting for estimates) might result in insufficient auditor 
attention to imprecision when the risk of bias is low.    
Regulatory Inspections and Audit Practitioner Methodology  
 PCAOB inspections of audit firms routinely focus on procedures performed around 
accounting estimates (Griffith et al. 2015a). While inspections evaluate multiple components of 
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audits, the PCAOB’s 2016 Staff Inspection Brief specifically identifies procedures performed in 
response to “the potential for management bias” in “fair value measurements and other 
accounting estimates” as a point of emphasis for inspectors (PCAOB 2016, 5). This focus echoes 
past pronouncements by the PCAOB that link auditors’ professional skepticism with the review 
of accounting estimates for management bias (e.g., PCAOB 2012). 
SAS 99 calls for audit training to incorporate fraud detection and prevention (AICPA 
2002). While the impact of this call on audit firms’ training curricula is difficult to assess, firms 
strongly advocate methodology that reflects vigilance for management bias, especially when 
auditing accounts that require significant judgment (e.g., Bell, Peecher, and Solomon 2005; 
Glover and Prawitt 2013; CAQ 2017). In interviews conducted by Griffith et al. (2015a), when 
auditors describe the process of evaluating whether estimates are reasonable in light of the audit 
evidence, “[a]uditors’ descriptions focus mainly on detecting bias in management’s estimates” 
(849). Although auditors might not always effectively detect management bias or fraud (e.g., 
Hammersley, Bamber, and Carpenter 2010; Boritz, Kochetova-Kozloski, and Robinson 2015), 
the above suggests that regulators and practitioners strongly emphasize the importance of 
auditors’ sensitivity to risks arising from management bias. 
Improving Auditors’ Approach to Complex Estimates  
 Because complex accounting estimates are particularly susceptible to management bias, 
recent studies have focused on improving auditors’ ability to address bias in estimates.8 Griffith 
et al. 2015b, Rasso (2015), and Tegeler (2017) demonstrate that auditors’ mindsets can play an 
important role in identifying likely indicators of management bias, making appropriate 
assessments of the reasonableness of a biased estimate, and taking actions necessary to correct 
                                                     
8 See Bratten, Gaynor, McDaniel, Montague, and Sierra (2013) for a broad review of prior research that speaks to 
how auditors approach complex estimates. 
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financial reporting. Austin, Hammersley, and Ricci (2016) show how audit documentation 
instructions impact auditors’ interpretation and evaluation of evidence related to a biased 
estimate. Emett, Libby, and Nelson (2016) and Backof, Martin, and Thayer (2016) speak to how 
the distribution of misstatements across a portfolio of estimated amounts and review of prior-
period estimation accuracy, respectively, can shape auditors’ assessments of management bias. 
Kachelmeier and Van Landuyt (2017) document how auditor-client social bonds give rise to 
insufficient adjustment of biased reporting in accounts with measurement uncertainty. Although 
not always focused specifically on complex estimates, a vast literature on auditors’ response to 
fraud risks similarly illuminates factors that inhibit or improve auditors’ ability to effectively 
deal with risks arising from biased financial reporting (e.g., Hoffman and Zimbelman 2009; 
Bowlin 2011; Hammersley 2011; Hammersley, Johnstone, and Kadous 2011; Kachelmeier, 
Majors, and Williamson 2014).  
 While prior studies provide insight into how auditors can better respond to management 
bias and fraud, auditors face risks from multiple sources. My incremental contribution lies in 
examining how emphasizing risks related to bias might impact auditor sensitivity to another 
important source of risk: measurement imprecision. Theory elaborated below suggests that when 
the audit environment places a strong emphasis on one consideration, auditors are likely to be 
less sensitive to other important considerations. Applying this premise to complex accounting 
estimates, for which both bias and imprecision are significant sources of risk, provides a more 
complete picture of how efforts intended to improve auditors’ response to management bias are 
likely to impact overall audit quality.    
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How Emphasizing Risk Impacts Auditors’ Consideration of Risk  
Emphasis typically increases the salience and perceived importance of the emphasized 
factor, and can alter subsequent judgments and decisions (e.g., Taylor and Fiske 1978; Elliott 
2006). This effect of emphasis extends to individuals’ behavior in the face of risk. For example, 
Weinstein, Grubb, and Vautier (1986) find that emphasizing the link between seat belt use and 
susceptibility to personal risk increases individuals’ use of seat belts. However, Weinstein et al. 
(1986) do not speak to what effect, if any, emphasizing seat belt use would have on other 
behaviors that impact personal safety when driving an automobile, such as using a turn signal. 
On one hand, psychology theory related to attention suggests that individuals allocate 
cognitive resources from a fixed pool of processing capacity and have difficulty dividing 
attention between multiple stimuli (e.g., Kahneman 1973; Duncan 1980). Theory and 
experimental results from a wide range of contexts demonstrate how specific motivational 
factors and characteristics of stimuli influence individuals’ perceptions of cue relevance and, in 
turn, propensity to thoroughly and objectively consider all relevant information (e.g., Einhorn 
and Hogarth 1981; Petty and Cacioppo 1986; Maheswaran, Mackie, and Chaiken 1992; Griffith, 
Nolder, and Petty 2017). It follows that emphasizing one factor is likely to come at the expense 
of individuals’ attention towards other relevant factors. On the other hand, this conclusion is not 
self-evident given standard economic reasoning that individuals generally respond to explicit 
monetary incentives that would promote careful consideration of relevant information, especially 
in transparent or well-defined settings (e.g., Smith 1991; Bonner and Sprinkle 2002).9 
To help reconcile these viewpoints and develop a prediction for when and how 
emphasizing source(s) of risk auditors face impacts audit effort, I incorporate theory related to 
                                                     
9 Additionally, Farrell, Goh, and White 2014 provide evidence that performance-based incentives activate more 
deliberative, systematic information processing.  
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dual process models of human thought (e.g., Stanovich and West 2002; Evans and Stanovich 
2013; Griffith, Kadous, and Young 2016). Dual process models comprise a broad swatch of 
psychological theories that generally differentiate between cognitive processes commonly 
employed by individuals making judgments and decisions.10 At one end of the spectrum are 
relatively simple, intuitive processes that often rely on heuristic decision rules. At the other end 
of the spectrum are more thorough, deliberative, and systematic mental processes.  
Because heuristic processing requires less effort, individuals tend to rely on simple 
decision rules unless the individual determines that more systematic processing is needed 
(Kahneman and Frederick 2005). While heuristic processing can facilitate proper decisions at 
less cognitive cost in many situations, it can also lead to systematic errors (e.g., Tversky and 
Kahneman 1974). Chen and Chaiken (1999) and Chen, Duckworth, and Chaiken (1999) argue 
that heuristic processing is most likely to occur when potential cues are available, accessible, and 
applicable. Therefore, placing emphasis on one cue not only elevates the prominence of that cue, 
but likely encourages individuals to engage in heuristic processing on the basis of information 
conveyed by that cue, potentially impairing the ability to determine whether more systematic 
processing is warranted. 
Risks surrounding complex accounting estimates arise due to the potential for 
management bias and the presence of measurement imprecision. Given the extreme estimation 
uncertainty documented by recent research (Christensen et al. 2012; Cannon and Bedard 2016), I 
make a simplifying assumption that risks posed by measurement imprecision in this setting are 
constant and high in magnitude.11 When environmental factors place an imbalanced emphasis on 
                                                     
10 See Strack and Deutsch (2015) for a broad review of dual process theories, and Griffith et al. (2016, 2017) for 
discussions of dual-process implications for auditing.     
11 Given that risks related to measurement imprecision are not constant in the real world, my study does not speak to 
the effects of variation in measurement imprecision (e.g., Griffin 2014) or how different levels of imprecision might 
31 
 
management bias, auditors are likely to rely heuristically on information conveyed by that cue. 
That is, the relative risk of management bias (i.e., high versus low risk) becomes a simple 
decision rule auditors can utilize when allocating effort towards auditing complex estimates.12 
When the risk of bias is high, auditors are likely to respond with a high level of audit effort due 
to the information conveyed by the heuristic cue appropriately signaling the need for a diligent 
response. When the risk of bias is low, however, auditors using management bias as a heuristic 
cue are likely to “lower their guard” more than what would be warranted given a systematic 
consideration that more fully takes risks related to measurement imprecision into account.  
When environmental factors place a balanced emphasis on management bias and 
measurement imprecision, the relative risk of management bias is less likely to serve as a 
heuristic cue and, as a result, auditors are likely to engage in relatively more systematic 
processing. While effort will still be high when the risk of management bias is high, a more 
systematic approach will allow auditors to better appreciate, and more appropriately respond to, 
risks arising from measurement imprecision when the risk of bias is low. Formally stated, I test 
the following hypothesis.      
Hypothesis: Regardless of whether environmental factors place a balanced emphasis on 
risks related to management bias and measurement imprecision, or an imbalanced 
emphasis on management bias, auditors will exert a high level of audit effort when the 
risk of management bias is high. Relative to a balanced emphasis on risks related to both 
management bias and measurement imprecision, an imbalanced emphasis on the risk of 
bias will cause auditors to choose a significantly less optimal level of costly audit effort 
when the risk of management bias is low. 
  
                                                     
interact with the constructs I manipulate. However, holding imprecision constant provides a clean setting to develop 
and test theory regarding the joint effect of institutional features in the current audit environment that place an 
imbalanced emphasis on management bias and different levels of the risk of bias. 
12 Risks vary across clients, such that auditors routinely encounter different magnitudes of risk in different settings 
(e.g., Bhattacharjee, Maletta, and Moreno 2007; Hallman 2017). Observable differences between clients such as 
perceived management integrity and internal control strength are examples of factors likely to give rise to relative 
differences in the risk of management bias. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Method and Design 
Task 
 To capture the most important incentives and dynamics relevant to the real world setting 
of interest while still providing a clean test of theory, I utilize a research design following the 
tenets of experimental economics. Specifically, I construct a game that represents a strategic 
interaction between two players: a reporter and an auditor. My setting operationalizes a high 
level of risk arising from measurement imprecision, warranting a diligent response from auditors, 
but holds that risk constant across conditions to test for the joint impact of management bias risk 
(manipulated within-participants) and environmental factors emphasizing source(s) of risk 
(manipulated between-participants) on audit effort. Abstract terminology and student participants 
help prevent other contextual factors common in real audits from confounding the behavioral 
phenomenon I seek to test (Haynes and Kachelmeier 1998).  
The experimental instructions and task are administered through linked computers 
operating the z-Tree interface for economic experiments (Fischbacher 2007). To ensure 
participants understand the task, the instructions (which are identical for both participant types) 
are extensive. At their own pace, participants work though several screens of information that 
explain the parameters of the game and include multiple embedded comprehension checks and a 
quiz reviewing the most important elements. Incorrect answers prompt remedial instructions. 
Participants must respond correctly to all comprehension checks and quiz questions before 
beginning the task. 
The reporter, referred to in the experimental materials as “Player A,” is the first mover. 
The reporter’s job is to estimate the value of an asset based on a private signal that is noisy, but 
unbiased. Specifically, the signal is equal to the true value of the asset plus some unknown 
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amount of noise randomly drawn from a discrete uniform distribution over the interval -15 to 15. 
Because the signal is within the asset’s true value plus or minus 15, the reporter’s estimate is 
constrained to be within plus or minus 15 of the signal. To aid in comprehension, the task is 
presented to participants as guessing the number of marbles in a sealed container. The number of 
marbles is representative of true asset value and the reporter’s guess corresponds to a complex 
accounting estimate. Participants are told that because the container of marbles is sealed, the 
reporter cannot count the marbles and must make a guess after viewing a measurement of the 
container’s weight provided by an imprecise scale. 
For making the guess, the reporter receives a fixed payment of $5. My first manipulation, 
described in detail below, involves the determination of an additional payment to the reporter 
that ranges from $0 to $15. The determination of this additional payment, manipulated within-
participants, creates incentives for the reporter to exhibit either upward bias or accuracy (to the 
extent possible given the inherent imprecision of the signal) in his/her estimate. Because the 
private signal is unbiased in expectation, reporters incentivized to be accurate are best served by 
simply making their estimate equal to the private signal.    
 Participants in the auditor role, “Player B,” are matched with a reporter and view the 
estimate, but not the imprecise signal. Thus, while the auditor is always aware of whether s/he is 
paired with a reporter incentivized to be biased or unbiased, the auditor does not know the extent 
to which the reporter’s estimate deviates from the imprecise signal, and neither player knows the 
asset’s true value. The auditor is endowed with $20, but faces exposure to a penalty analogous to 
the negative consequences of an audit failure including exposure to litigation, costs of a 
restatement, loss of reputation, or sanctions due to regulatory inspections that detect a lack of 
diligence (e.g., Palmrose 2000; Chaney and Philipich 2002; Glover, Taylor, and Wu 2016).  
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The auditor’s potential penalty is based on the absolute value of the difference between 
the reporter’s estimate and the true asset value. Specifically, if the reporter’s guess is off by more 
than 5 marbles, but less than 15 marbles, the number of marbles by which the guess is off 
equates to the amount of the auditor’s penalty in U.S. Dollars.13 Capturing the notion of 
materiality, the auditor does not face any penalty if the reporter’s guess is within 5 marbles of the 
actual number in the container. For guesses that are off by 15 marbles or more, the auditor’s 
exposure is capped at $15.    
To mitigate the likelihood of incurring the penalty, the auditor chooses a level of costly 
audit effort (labeled in the experimental materials as a “Protection Level”) that ranges from 1 to 
10. The auditor must pay $0.50 for the lowest level of audit effort, and an additional $0.50 for 
each incremental level. This costly action represents my primary dependent variable. As shown 
in Table 1, Panel A, the probability that the auditor incurs a penalty decreases as audit effort 
increases. Although the game does not incorporate a specific realization of audit evidence or an 
explicit adjustment to the estimate generated by the reporter (Kachelmeier and Van Landuyt 
2017), costly effort in my setting nevertheless protects auditors from a penalty much in the same 
way that high levels of audit effort in the real world increase auditors’ ability to detect 
misreporting or avoid punitive actions from inspectors citing lack of diligence.   
The auditor’s effort choice affects the probability that the reporter incurs a separate 
penalty that ranges from $0 to $5. This penalty captures costs imposed on reporters when 
auditors increase scrutiny on reported amounts or take corrective actions for detected errors (e.g., 
                                                     
13 GAAS requires auditors to obtain reasonable assurance that financial statements are free from material 
misstatements whether due to fraud or error (AICPA 2011). In my setting, bias (i.e., fraud) suggests a risk of 
overstatement, but imprecision (i.e., error) can result in overstatement or understatement. While, in practice, auditors 
might face greater financial exposure for reports misstated due to fraud, equal exposure to overstatement and 
understatement in my setting biases against auditor-participants neglecting the impact of measurement imprecision.   
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Gibbons, Salterio, and Webb 2001).14  Specifically, the amount of the reporter’s penalty is equal 
to $1 for each marble by which the reporter’s guess is off in excess of 5 marbles. For guesses that 
are off by 10 marbles or more, the penalty is capped at $5. Table 1, Panel B shows the 
relationship between audit effort and the probability that the reporter incurs this penalty. Whether 
or not the reporter incurs a penalty is determined independently of the auditor’s penalty, thus 
mitigating the effects of retribution or fairness (e.g., Fehr and Gächter 2000) that are extraneous 
to the theory my experiment is designed to test. The auditor’s and reporter’s payoff functions are 
summarized below: 
Reporter’s payoff = $5 + Additional Compensation ranging from $0 to $15 – Reporter’s 
Penalty ranging from $0 to $5 (if incurred) 
 
Auditor’s payoff = $20 – Cost of Audit Effort – Auditor’s Penalty ranging from $0 to $15 
(if incurred) 
 
Participants and Procedure 
 Participants consist of 90 undergraduate students enrolled in introductory accounting 
classes at a large public university who are randomly assigned a role analogous to either an 
auditor (n = 68) or reporter (n = 22). Each experimental session has exactly two reporters, with 
the rest of the participants assigned to the role of auditor. Although the experimental task takes 
place between auditors and reporters interacting in pairs, participants are aware that multiple 
auditors may be matched with a single reporter and that the decisions made by one randomly 
selected matched auditor are used for determining each reporter’s final payment. Matching 
multiple auditors with a single reporter helps to prevent idiosyncratic differences in reporters’ 
                                                     
14 Although companies that issue misstated financial statements also face exposure to other potential costs that are 
reduced through high audit effort (e.g., litigation and subsequent restatements), I abstract from these considerations 
to simplify the experimental setting. These elements could easily be incorporated into the reporter’s payoff function 
without altering equilibrium behaviors, but would significantly increase the complexity of the game.  
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estimates from confounding the experimental manipulations as drivers of observed differences in 
auditors’ effort choices.15  
The experimental task is repeated by anonymous auditor/reporter pairings for two sets of 
five rounds (10 rounds total). Monetary balances do not carry over from round to round, and 
outcomes (such as the selected level of audit effort and true asset value) are not revealed until the 
end of the session. Accordingly, each round represents an independent one-shot game. While 
multi-period considerations like audit pricing, reputation building, and client retention (e.g., 
Calegari, Schatzberg, and Sevcik 1998; Mayhew 2001; Schatzberg, Sevcik, Shapiro, Thorne, and 
Olusegun Wallace 2005) are certainly relevant to real world audits, incorporating such 
considerations into my setting would add unnecessary complications that are unrelated to the 
theory I test.  
One potentially important element of multi-period games that my setting does not capture 
is auditors’ ability to learn from past audit failures. While improvements driven by outcome 
feedback have been detected in abstract economic games (e.g., Koch and Schmidt 2010), it does 
not necessarily follow that real-world auditors appropriately learn from experience (Waller and 
Felix 1984; Hogarth 1991). Given that task complexity reduces the benefits of auditor learning 
from outcome feedback (Leung and Trotman 2005), it seems unlikely that, in practice, feedback 
from audits of complex estimates would eliminate the behavioral effect I examine.        
True asset values and the reporter’s noisy signal change in each period, but realizations of 
these random amounts are determined in advance and held constant across experimental 
sessions. After the first set of five rounds, auditor/reporter pairings rotate and participants 
                                                     
15 Specifically, having only two reporters per session results in the minimum possible variance in the estimates 
actually viewed by auditors while still allowing auditors to be matched with a different reporter in the alternative 
within-participants bias risk conditions, as explained below.   
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complete the second set of five rounds. Prior to the start of each set of five rounds, participants 
are reminded of the method used to determine reporters’ additional compensation (manipulated 
within-participants) for that particular set of five rounds. Before the start of each set of five 
rounds, auditors provide an assessment of the overall risk they face in the upcoming set of five 
rounds.   
At the end of the second set of five rounds, participants complete a post-experimental 
questionnaire. Following the questionnaire, the outcomes from one randomly selected round 
from the first set of five rounds and one randomly selected round from the second set of five are 
used to determine participants’ payoffs, which are displayed on the computer screen. Participants 
are then paid and dismissed. On average, participants earn $29.94, including a $5 “show up” 
payment, for an approximately 60-minute experimental session.        
Manipulation of the Risk of Management Bias 
 As noted previously, I use the additional compensation included in the reporter’s payoff 
function to manipulate, within-participants, the risk of management bias. The method used to 
determine the additional compensation changes between the first and second set of five rounds. 
Importantly, the instructions fully describe both compensation schemes prior to start of the first 
round such that, as in the real world, auditors are aware from the outset that the risk of bias can 
be relatively high or low.16 The ordering of the two compensation schemes is counter-balanced 
between experimental sessions to control for order effects. 
                                                     
16 To the extent that the within-participants manipulation of reporters’ incentives elevates auditors’ attention to 
reporter bias, this design feature would bias the results in favor of a main effect, but not the predicted interaction. It 
is worth noting that measurement imprecision is similarly demonstrated to auditors through observation of multiple 
reports, of varying magnitudes, throughout the course of the ten experimental rounds. This design feature would bias 
against auditors’ neglecting risks arising from imprecision. 
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When a reporter is incentivized to exhibit bias, his/her additional compensation increases 
as the number of marbles s/he guesses increases. Recall that the reporter can guess any amount 
between the signal minus 15 and the signal plus 15. If a reporter in the “high risk of bias” 
condition guesses the signal minus 15 (the lowest possible guess), his/her additional 
compensation is $0. The reporter receives an additional $0.50 for each marble s/he guesses in 
excess of this minimum guess, up to a maximum of $15 for guessing the signal plus 15. Figure 2, 
Panel A graphically depicts this compensation scheme. All else equal, marginal gains from 
inflating the report outweigh associated increases in the reporter’s expected penalty (which 
ranges from $0 to $5). Thus, a reporter in the high risk of bias condition maximizes expected 
wealth by making the highest possible estimate given the signal observed.  
 When a reporter is incentivized to be unbiased, his/her additional compensation increases 
as the actual number of marbles in the container increases, as opposed to the number of marbles 
guessed. Recall that the signal can be any amount between true asset value (i.e., the actual 
number of marbles in the container) minus 15 and true asset value plus 15. If the actual number 
of marbles in the container is equal to the signal minus 15 (the lowest possible realization of 
asset value), the reporter’s additional compensation is $0. The reporter receives an additional 
$0.50 for each marble in the container beyond this minimum possible amount, up to $15 if the 
actual number of marbles in the container is equal to the signal plus 15. Figure 2, Panel B 
graphically depicts this compensation scheme. Because the reporter’s estimate does not influence 
his/her additional compensation in this condition, but can contribute to the amount of the 
reporter’s penalty, a reporter in this condition maximizes expected wealth by making a guess that 
is equal to the private signal (which is a noisy, but unbiased estimate of truth). 
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 The reporter’s incentives in the low risk of bias condition bear some similarity to Hales 
(2007), but in a context analogous to financial reporting rather than investing. Hales (2007) 
provides evidence that directional preferences bias investors’ valuation judgments even when 
investors are incentivized to make accurate judgments. In my setting, when a reporter’s estimate 
does not increase his/her payment, the reporter’s payment does increase as the actual number of 
marbles in the container increase. Motivated reasoning (Kunda 1990), which forms the 
theoretical underpinning for Hales (2007), suggests that due to preferences for a higher number 
of marbles in the container, even reporters in the low risk of bias condition are likely to exhibit 
some degree of upward bias in their estimates. Thus, beyond implications for auditing, reporter 
behavior in my setting has potential to offer insights into unintentional biases surrounding the 
financial reporting of uncertain amounts.  
 From an auditing perspective, the potential for upward bias, even when the risk of bias 
should be low, represents a threat to audit outcomes conceptually distinct from auditors 
neglecting risks related to measurement imprecision. Motivated reasoning suggests that reporters 
are likely to be at least somewhat biased, despite incentives to be unbiased, as long as they 
possess directional preferences for the amounts being estimated. The potential for such 
unintentional bias suggests the possibility that auditors might underestimate the effects of 
management bias in situations where the risk of bias should ostensibly be low. In other words, 
under-auditing when the risk of bias is low could result from auditors relying heuristically on the 
relative risk of bias, as argued in Chapter III, or from auditors failing to adequately anticipate the 
presence of unintentional upward bias despite reporters’ incentives to be accurate.         
 While I do not formalize the preceding argument as a hypothesis, allowing for the 
possibility that reporter-participants might not exhibit wealth-maximizing behavior not only 
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offers an opportunity for insights stemming from unintentional reporting biases, but also 
illustrates the importance of utilizing human participants, rather than programmed algorithms, 
for the role of reporter. Auditors plan audit procedures in response to risks, not known reporting 
outcomes. Operationalizing the risk of management bias through financial reporting incentives, 
and not more directly through imposed reporter behavior, facilitates a more externally valid 
experimental setting and, by extension, a more informative normative evaluation of auditor 
behavior in response to actual and perceived risk. More importantly, the possibility that reporters 
exhibit upward bias even when incentivized to be impartial underscores the importance 
mitigating under-auditing when the risk of bias is low. Future research could directly investigate 
whether auditors adequately anticipate unintentional reporting biases. In the context of my 
experiment, reporter bias in situations where the risk of bias should be low exacerbates negative 
consequences of insufficient audit effort stemming from insensitivity to measurement 
imprecision.    
Manipulation of Environmental Emphasis on Risk  
I operationalize the between-participants manipulation of an environmental emphasis on 
bias (“bias-emphasis”) versus bias and imprecision (“dual-emphasis”) through wording that 
appears only to auditors immediately prior to the instructions and prior to the start of each set of 
five rounds. Across conditions, the instructions provide all participants with extensive training 
on how reporters’ incentives (manipulated within-participants) and measurement imprecision 
(held constant across conditions) could impact reporters’ estimates. However, the additional 
wording that places emphasis on bias versus bias and imprecision differs. Specifically, wording 
the bias-emphasis condition emphasizes how the reporter’s incentives are likely to impact his/her 
report in the high and low risk of bias condition. Wording in the dual-emphasis condition 
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emphasizes both the reporter’s incentives and the imprecision of the scale used to weigh the 
marbles.  
Specifically, when the risk of bias is high, both the bias- and dual- emphasis conditions 
explicitly emphasize that “Player A has incentives to always guess more marbles than indicated 
by the measurement provided by the scale.” When the risk is low, both emphasis conditions 
remind participants that “Player A’s incentives are best served when he or she guesses a number 
that is close to the measurement provided by the scale.”  Regardless of the risk of bias, the dual-
emphasis condition provides the additional emphasis that “the fact that the scale used to weigh 
the marbles is imprecise contributes to the possibility that the measurement viewed by Player A, 
and ultimately his or her guess, might not be very close to the actual number of marbles in the 
container.” Figure 3 shows a timeline of the experimental session and the complete wording used 
to convey the between-participants emphasis conditions. With the exception of what is depicted 
in Figure 3, Panels B and C, I hold all other wording constant across conditions. 
The abstract nature of the task and manipulation is intended to capture the effects, and 
speak to behavioral consequences, of a broad set of environmental factors that contribute to an 
institutional emphasis on bias such as fraud brainstorming sessions. That is, although participants 
in my setting do not actually engage in brainstorming, just as fraud brainstorming meetings are 
intended to ensure that all members of the audit team are aware of the engagement-specific risks  
stemming from intentional bias, wording in the bias-emphasis condition reminds auditor 
participants how reporters’ incentives are likely to shape reporter behavior. The dual-emphasis 
condition speaks to the possibility of regulators and practitioners engaging in deliberate efforts to 
place a more balanced emphasis on bias and imprecision. For example, fraud brainstorming 
sessions could be augmented to include discussions of other relevant sources of risk. For clients 
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where complex estimates represent a meaningful portion of the balance sheet, this would include 
discussions specifically geared toward risks posed by measurement imprecision, regardless of 
whether the risk of bias is relatively high or low.       
Optimal Strategies  
 As noted above, reporters in the high risk of bias condition maximize expected payoff, 
irrespective of the level of audit effort, by making the highest estimate possible (the signal plus 
15). Reporters in the low risk of bias condition maximize wealth by simply making an estimate 
that is equal to the signal because this minimizes the expected amount of their penalty. For 
auditors, imprecision alone is large enough to warrant a relatively high level of audit effort, 
while management bias increases the magnitude of risk that auditors face.17 Given wealth-
maximizing behavior on the part of the reporter, auditors’ best response in the high risk of bias 
condition is to exert maximum audit effort (10 on the scale from 1 to 10), while auditors’ best 
response in the low risk of bias condition is an effort level of 8.  
However, as shown in Section IV, reporters in my game do not exhibit as much upward 
bias as predicted based solely on the assumption of wealth-maximization. Likewise, auditors in 
my game do not expect reporters in the high risk of bias condition to manipulate the report 
upward to the fullest extent possible. Therefore, auditors’ optimal response to actual and 
expected reporter behavior provides a more informative benchmark for normative evaluation of 
observed auditor behavior in light of actual and expected risk. Given either the actual levels of 
misreporting observed in my study, or auditors’ average expectations for misreporting, auditors’ 
best response in both the high and low risk of bias condition is to exert an effort level of 8. 
                                                     
17 This corresponds to a real world setting in which an estimate’s reasonable range can be many times larger than 
audit materiality (Christensen et al. 2012; Cannon and Bedard 2016), and regulators and practitioners recognize the 
need for auditors to devote a high level of effort to these accounts (e.g., Griffith et al. 2015a; Glover et al. 2017) 
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Appendix A provides a complete description of the parameters and a discussion of equilibrium 
behavior.  
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CHAPTER V 
Results 
Manipulation Checks 
 To confirm that auditors are attuned to the within-participants manipulation driving the 
risk of management bias, the post-experimental questionnaire asks auditors to recall the order in 
which they were paired with a reporter compensated based on the actual realization of the asset’s 
value (i.e., the number of marbles in the container) versus the reporter’s estimate. Only one 
participant answered this question incorrectly, and excluding that participant from my analyses 
does not alter the statistical conclusions reported below. 18 Additionally, auditors expect reporters 
compensated based on true asset value (the estimate) to guess an average of 1.06 (13.43) more 
marbles than the number indicated by the reporters’ private signal. A repeated-measures 
ANOVA (untabulated) confirms that auditors expect significantly more upward bias from 
reporters incentivized to be biased (one-tailed p < 0.01), with no between-participants differences 
driven by emphasis (two-tailed p = 0.25). Thus, the manipulation of reporters’ incentives results 
in meaningful differences in the risk of bias anticipated by auditors. 
With regard to the between-participants manipulation of emphasis, the post-experimental 
questionnaire asks auditors to rate how much emphasis the experimental materials place on the 
fact that “Player A’s guess” and “the imprecision of the scale” each contribute to the amount of 
auditors’ potential loss. As shown in Table 2, responses to the question measuring perceived 
emphasis on bias (i.e., Player A’s guess) do not differ between the condition emphasizing bias 
only and the condition emphasizing bias and imprecision (t65 = 0.94, two-tailed p = 0.35). 
However, responses to the question measuring perceived emphasis on imprecision are 
                                                     
18 Additionally, one auditor-participant failed to complete the post-experimental questionnaire. Excluding this 
participant, individually, or both this participant and the participant that incorrectly recalled the order of Player A’s 
compensation does not alter inferences from my analyses.   
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significantly higher for auditors in the dual-emphasis condition, relative to the bias-emphasis 
condition (t65 = 2.16, one-tailed p = 0.02). Thus, as intended, an emphasis on the risk of bias is 
salient in both conditions, but auditors perceive a higher emphasis on risks arising from 
imprecision in the dual-emphasis condition, relative to auditors in the bias-emphasis condition.  
Beyond the manipulation checks, it is important to ensure that the between-participants 
manipulation altered the perceived emphasis on, and not participants’ understanding of, 
measurement imprecision.  The detailed instructions and multiple comprehension checks 
described previously provide some assurance that the emphasis manipulation should not affect 
participants’ basic understanding of the parameters of the game. To verify that participants, 
particularly in the bias-emphasis condition, are aware of the implications of measurement 
imprecision, I turn to responses from a post-experimental question asking auditors to recall the 
amount of imprecision present in the measurement of the asset. All auditors correctly answered 
this question. Also, as shown in Table 2, Panel B, auditors in the bias-emphasis condition were 
aware of at least some emphasis being placed on measurement imprecision.19 In sum, it appears 
that the between-participants manipulation was successful in manipulating emphasis, while 
ensuring that all participants understood the implications of imprecision for the experimental 
task.     
Primary Findings 
Audit Effort 
 To test the hypothesized interaction, I examine auditors’ average levels of costly audit 
effort over the five experimental rounds comprising the high risk of bias condition and the five 
rounds comprising the low risk of bias condition. Results are depicted in Figure 4. Table 3 
                                                     
19 Regarding my study’s ability to generalize, this finding is reassuring in light of the fact that professional 
standards, and other aspects of the current audit environment, certainly do not ignore measurement imprecision.  
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reports descriptive statistics and a repeated-measures ANOVA that analyzes the risk of 
management bias as a within-participants factor and emphasis as a between-participants factor.20 
Unsurprisingly, I find a strong main effect of the risk of bias (F1,66 = 41.02, two-tailed p < 0.01), 
indicating that auditors exert more effort when the risk of bias is high. More importantly, I also 
find a significant interaction between the risk of bias and emphasis (F1,66 = 4.15, two-tailed p = 
0.05). Confirming my hypothesis, simple effects show that auditors in the bias-emphasis 
condition exert less costly effort than auditors in the dual-emphasis condition when the risk of 
bias is low (F1,66 = 2.65, one-tailed p = 0.05), but not when the risk of bias is high (F1,66 = 0.24, 
two-tailed p > 0.50).21  
The key insight from this analysis of auditors’ costly effort choices is that, as predicted, 
an imbalanced emphasis on reporter bias, versus a more balanced emphasis on both bias an 
imprecision, leads to under-auditing when the risk of bias is low. This implies that environmental 
factors intended to increase auditors’ sensitivity to the risk of management bias appear to have 
the effect of decreasing auditors’ responsiveness to risks arising from imprecision in complex 
estimates. When the risk of bias is low, emphasizing bias causes auditors to “lower their guard” 
to a greater extent than when environmental factors place a more balanced emphasis on both bias 
and imprecision. Viewed in light of auditors’ best response to both actual and expected reporter 
                                                     
20 Average effort in each of the four experimental cells is below the optimal level, suggesting that participants in all 
conditionals appear willing to assume more risk than expected given predictions based solely on the intuition of 
economic wealth-maximization. One explanation for this finding could be fairness considerations or other common 
reasons that individuals deviate from purely self-interested behavior in economic games (e.g., Fehr and Gächter 
2000).     
21 To control for the impact of reporters’ specific estimates on chosen levels of audit effort, I also recast the data in a 
panel in which each auditor provides ten observations – one for each experimental round. Results from a baseline 
OLS regression that includes auditor fixed effects (untabulated) are inferentially consistent with the repeated 
measures ANOVA. Including the reporters’ estimates as a control variable in the model strengthens my primary 
results and also indicates a significant main effect of reporters’ estimates (p < 0.01). Controlling for the counter-
balanced order in which reporters’ incentives vary does not alter the impact of the other variables in the model, and 
the effect of order is not significant (p > 0.50).      
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behavior, this pattern of results indicates that an imbalanced emphasis on bias causes auditors to 
make a significantly less optimal allocation of resources when the risk of bias is low. 
Also of note, solely emphasizing bias appears to confer no significant benefit when the 
risk of management bias is high, as auditors exert a relatively high level of effort regardless of 
emphasis condition. Although auditors in the bias-emphasis condition do exert slightly more 
effort when the risk of bias is high, the difference is not statistically significant (F1,66 = 0.24, two-
tailed p > 0.50). Therefore, emphasizing the importance of risks related to bias and imprecision 
appears to mitigate under-auditing when management bias poses less of a threat, without diluting 
auditors’ response to bias.  
Risk Assessment 
 Although my hypothesis specifies the effects of the manipulated variables for audit effort, 
it follows that auditors’ assessments of overall risk, measured prior to the start of the two sets of 
five experimental rounds, would exhibit the hypothesized pattern.22 Table 4 suggests that, while 
the relative risk of bias has a strong main effect on auditors’ risk assessments (F1,66 = 46.3, two-
tailed p < 0.01), there is no main effect of emphasis (F1,66 = 0.07, two-tailed p > 0.50) and the 
two manipulated variables do not interact (F1,66 = 1.49, two-tailed p = 0.23).  
This finding indicates that auditors’ judgments of risk are not impaired in same way that 
audit effort choices appear to be, suggesting that an imbalanced emphasis on bias has a 
subconscious impact on audit effort decisions. Put differently, when the risk of bias is low, there 
is no meaningful difference between auditors’ assessments of overall risk, and yet auditors in the 
                                                     
22 This rationale reflects standard intuition that individuals’ behavior in economic settings typically reflects their 
beliefs (e.g., Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003). However, beliefs and behavior are not always aligned (e.g., Seybert and 
Bloomfield 2009). 
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bias-emphasis condition exert significantly less audit effort. The supplemental analysis reported 
next adds additional insight that is helpful for interpreting this finding.  
Supplemental Analysis: The Perceived Impact of Imprecision on Audit Effort 
 To provide evidence on the process underlying my primary findings, I examine auditors’ 
response to a post-experimental question eliciting the extent to which auditors perceive that 
measurement imprecision influences their chosen level of audit effort. On average, auditors in 
both the bias-emphasis and dual-emphasis conditions acknowledge that risks related to 
measurement imprecision have a meaningful impact on their audit effort decisions.23 However, if 
my primary findings regarding audit effort are driven by a subconscious impact of an imbalanced 
emphasis on bias, then auditors’ perceptions regarding the extent to which imprecision drives 
audit effort are unlikely to be predictive of actual effort choices. Conversely, if auditors exposed 
to a balanced emphasis on bias and imprecision more deliberatively consider relevant risks, these 
auditors’ perceptions regarding the impact of imprecision on audit effort should be associated 
with the level of audit effort actually selected. 
Consistent with this reasoning, correlations shown in Table 5 indicate that although 
auditors in the bias-emphasis condition claim that imprecision has a large impact on their effort 
choices, these perceptions are uncorrelated with actual costly audit effort choices (two-tailed p-
values > 0.50). However, in the dual-emphasis condition, auditors exhibit a significant positive 
                                                     
23 On a seven-point scale anchored at 1 = “Strongly disagree” and 7 = “Strongly agree,” auditor participants respond 
to the following statement: “The fact that the scale Player A used to estimate the number of marbles in the container 
was not very precise had a big impact on the Protection Level I chose.” On average, auditors’ responses to this 
question are 4.94 and 5.10 in the bias and dual-emphasis conditions, respectively. These amounts are not statistically 
different (t65 = 0.45, two-tailed p > 0.50, untabulated), and both are significantly greater than the scale’s midpoint 
(both two-tailed p-values < 0.01, untabulated). 
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correlation between their perceptions of the impact of imprecision on effort choices and their 
actual effort choices (two-tailed p-values < 0.01). 24    
 These supplemental results provide evidence that, despite the level of risk auditors might 
consciously assess, measurement imprecision plays a different role when auditors translate 
assessed risks into audit effort decisions in the dual-emphasis, versus bias-emphasis, condition. 
The correlations in Table 5 are consistent with the theoretical premise that auditors in the bias-
emphasis condition rely heuristically on the relative risks of management bias, and therefore do 
not fully incorporate the implications of imprecision when making effort decisions. Likewise, 
consistent with auditors in the dual-emphasis condition engaging in more systematic processing, 
these auditors’ perceptions regarding the impact of imprecision on effort reflect auditors’ actual 
effort choices. 
Reporter Behavior   
Beyond results related to auditors, my study also offers insight into managers’ financial 
reporting decisions under incentives to exhibit accuracy or upward bias in complex accounting 
estimates. Figure 5, Panel A shows the imprecise signal provided to the reporter (i.e., the weight 
of the marbles according to the scale) for each of the 10 experimental rounds and reporters’ 
average guesses based on whether or not they are incentivized to exhibit bias. Figure 5, Panel B 
recasts reporter guesses relative to a standardized signal, thus depicting the average reporting 
bias exhibited in each period. Recall that the order in which reporters view the imprecise signals 
is held constant, but the order in which reporters are incentivized to exhibit bias is 
counterbalanced across experimental sessions.25 Table 6, Panel A shows the results of a paired t-
                                                     
24 Untabulated z-tests confirm the correlation coefficients in Panel C are statistically different between emphasis 
conditions (both two-tailed p-values < 0.08).   
25 n = 10 reporters were incentivized to be biased (unbiased) in the first (second) five rounds, and n = 12 reporters 
were unbiased (biased) in the first (second) five rounds. 
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test confirming that reporters exhibit significantly more upward bias when their compensation 
increases with their estimate relative to when their compensation is not linked to their estimate 
(t21 = 5.86, two-tailed p < 0.01). As shown in Table 6, Panel B, for reporters incentivized to be 
unbiased, the average difference between estimates and the imprecise signal, although modest, is 
significantly greater than zero (t21 = 2.97, two-tailed p < 0.01).   
Thus, consistent with Hales (2007) but in a context analogous to the financial reporting of 
complex accounting estimates, even reporters in the low risk of bias condition exhibit some 
degree of upward bias. Despite incentives to make accurate judgments, reporters’ preferences for 
a favorable uncertain outcome appear to add upward bias to estimates. This result contributes to 
the financial reporting literature by providing some initial evidence that, even if strong internal 
controls perfectly control managers’ economic incentives to exhibit bias, unintentional bias can 
still be present when managers possess directional preferences. With respect to implications for 
auditing, observing modest upward bias when reporters are incentivized to be impartial 
underscores the importance of mitigating the potential for under-auditing when the risk of bias 
appears to be low.  
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CHAPTER VI  
Conclusions 
 Complex accounting estimates present auditors with unique challenges. Due to their 
subjective and uncertain nature, complex estimates are particularly susceptible to the influence of 
management bias. Accordingly, a number of environmental factors emphasize the impact bias 
has on the risk that estimates are misstated. Overall, auditing standards tend to place a spotlight 
on the risk of bias. Trends suggest this emphasis is likely to increase as the PCAOB and IAASB 
develop new standards related to the audit of complex estimates. Additionally, PCAOB 
inspectors make audit procedures directed toward mitigating management bias in estimates a 
point of emphasis in their inspections and audit firms prescribe methodology that focuses auditor 
attention on the risk of management bias. 
 Independent of the potential effects of management bias, the measurement imprecision 
surrounding complex estimates is important in its own right. The reasonable ranges of complex 
estimates often exceed several multiples of audit materiality (Christensen et al. 2012; Cannon 
and Bedard 2016), leasing to audit failures in complex areas that are not caused exclusively by 
management bias (e.g., Fang et al. 2017). Although a significant source of risk, measurement 
imprecision is often not emphasized in the same way as management bias. Auditing Standards 
2110 and 2810, and SAS 99 – including required fraud brainstorming sessions – provide 
illustrative examples of environmental factors that elevate auditors’ focus on intentional bias, 
rather than risks arising solely from measurement imprecision. 
Preventing and detecting management bias is essential for successful audits, but it is 
important to ensure that efforts to increase auditors’ awareness of bias are not accompanied by 
diminished auditor sensitivity to measurement imprecision. My study indicates that auditors 
generally respond to a high risk of bias with a high level of audit effort. However, emphasizing 
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bias, versus bias and imprecision, causes auditors to “lower their guard” to a greater extent when 
management bias is less threatening but auditors still face significant risks  attributable to 
imprecision. Consistent with theory, supplemental analysis suggests that this weakness in auditor 
judgment stems from auditors using the relative risk of bias as a heuristic cue when deciding how 
much costly effort to exert. A more balanced emphasis on both bias and imprecision not only 
results in a more optimal allocation of audit effort, but also provides evidence that auditors 
employ a more deliberative, systematic decision making approach. 
 Beyond implications for auditing, my findings also speak to how managers’ preferences 
impact their estimates of subjective amounts. Applying a framework similar to Hales (2007) to 
financial reporting decisions, I find that even when reporters have financial incentives to make as 
accurate an estimate as possible, reporters’ preferences for a high realized value results in 
estimates that exhibit a modest degree of upward bias. Future research could consider possible 
methods to mitigate bias that occurs in settings where reporters do not possess incentives to 
exhibit bias, but nevertheless benefit from positive realizations of the estimated amount.   
Although my study does not test specific interventions that auditors might employ when 
considering complex estimates (e.g., Griffith et al. 2015b; Austin et al. 2016), my results 
nevertheless contribute evidence of, and a potential solution for, a potentially undesirable 
consequence of efforts intended to elevate auditors’ attention toward risks related to management 
bias. Giving risks arising from measurement imprecision “equal billing” with management bias 
in professional standards, inspections, and practitioner methodologies related to complex 
estimates would likely help mitigate auditors’ behavioral tendency to under-audit when the risk 
of bias is low. As a practical example, fraud brainstorming sessions could be augmented to 
include a discussion of other significant sources of risk. Thus, my findings are relevant to 
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regulators, inspectors, and auditors in roles that influence how factors present in the audit 
environment shape auditors’ attention toward risk.  
I encourage future research that investigates ways to elevate auditors’ awareness of 
potentially overlooked sources of risk. Regarding complex accounting estimates, I find that 
directing auditors’ attention toward management bias can come at the expense of an adequate 
response to risks arising from measurement imprecision. To conduct effective audits, auditors 
must be attuned to all significant sources of risk, not just the risk of intentional bias.
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FIGURES 
Figure 1 
A Framework for Considering the Technical and Social Challenges of Auditing Complex Estimates  
 Technical Challenges Remedies Social Challenges Remedies 
Environmental 
Factors 
    
Estimation 
uncertainty 
The magnitude of measurement 
uncertainty inhibits ability to 
provide positive assurance and 
exhibit professional skepticism 
(Christensen et al. 2012; 
Cannon and Bedard 2017; 
Glover et al. 2017) 
Additional disclosure, 
alternative requirements for 
level of assurance, expanded 
audit report (Christensen et al. 
2012; Glover et al. 2017) 
Supplemental disclosures 
reduce likelihood of audit 
adjustments (Griffin 2014) 
 
Uncertainty and auditor-client 
socials bonds prompt “the 
benefit of the doubt” 
(Kachelmeier and Van Landuyt 
2017) 
 
 
 
 
Increase the role of non-client 
facing personnel (Kachelmeier 
and Van Landuyt 2017) 
Regulatory 
environment 
PCAOB inspections shift focus 
from audit risk to “inspection 
risk” (Glover et al. 2016) 
Clarify expectations and 
increase expertise (Glover et al. 
2016) 
The application of current 
standards results in inconsistent 
adjustment decisions (Emett et 
al. 2016) 
 
A judgment quality, versus 
procedural, focus by inspectors 
improves audit judgments and 
skepticism (Tegeler 2017) 
Redefine misstatements as the 
difference between the reporter 
value and auditors’ best 
estimate (Emett et al. 2016) 
 
Inspections should place more 
focus on judgment quality, 
rather than procedures 
performed (Tegeler 2017) 
Legal environment     
Auditor-client 
relationship 
Management sometimes lacks 
adequate valuation knowledge 
or expertise (Glover et al. 
2017) 
 
Auditors find it difficult to 
persuade management to book 
adjustments (Cannon and 
Bedard 2017). 
 
 
 
 
Utilize specialists to convey to 
client the strength of evidence 
gathered (Cannon and Bedard 
2017) 
See Estimation uncertainty 
above 
See Estimation uncertainty 
above 
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Figure 1, cont. 
 Technical Challenges Remedies Social Challenges Remedies 
Auditor-specialist 
relationship 
Uncertainty leads to auditor 
disagreement with valuation 
specialists (Cannon and Bedard 
2017) 
 
Coordination challenges and 
lack of common vocabulary 
limits value provided by 
specialists (Griffith et al. 
2015a) 
 
Third-party pricing services 
often do not share proprietary 
information relevant to 
auditors' evaluation of 
estimates (Glover et al. 2017) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regulators could work to foster 
cooperation between third-
parties and auditors (Glover et 
al. 2017) 
Use of specialists can trigger 
defensive behavior from 
auditors, reducing the value of 
specialists' contributions to the 
audit (Griffith 2016a) 
 
Auditors do not fully 
appreciate entirety of 
information conveyed by 
specialists unless motivated to 
closely scrutinize estimates 
(Griffith 2016b) 
 
Specialists perform better when 
they feel they have 
psychological ownership over 
issues (Bauer et al. 2017) 
 
Auditors over rely on client-
hired specialists if firm tone-at-
the-top performance goals 
(Pyzoha et al. 2016) 
 
Quantification in reports from 
client-hired specialists 
decreases attention to 
subjective valuation inputs (Joe 
et al. 2017) 
More explicit guidance for 
incorporating specialists' work. 
More integration between 
specialists and audit teams 
(Griffith 2016a)  
 
Training and decision aids to 
motivate sensitivity to risk 
(Griffith 2016b) 
 
 
 
Increase auditors', including 
specialists', psychological 
ownership over tasks (Bauer et 
al. 2017) 
 
Promote (restrict) emphasis on 
audit quality (performance 
goals) (Pyzoha et al. 2016) 
 
 
Regulators may need to 
reconsider how audit tasks are 
structured to enhance attention 
to subjective areas (Joe et al. 
2017) 
Task Factors     
Task difficulty See Estimation uncertainty 
above 
 
Nonfinancial estimates are 
especially challenging (Glover 
et al 2017) 
See Estimation uncertainty 
above 
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Figure 1, cont. 
 Technical Challenges Remedies Social Challenges Remedies 
Task structure Verification approach to 
estimates results in auditors 
overlying on managements’' 
assumptions  (Griffith et al. 
2015a) 
Utilize an evaluation approach 
(Griffith et al. 2015a).  
 
Reconsider merits of using 
managements' assumptions to 
develop an independent 
estimate (Glover et al. 2017) 
Documentation instructions 
promoting high-level 
construals improve auditor 
judgments, actions, and 
skepticism (Rasso 2015) 
 
Audit guidance framing affects 
auditors’ judgments (Austin et 
al. 2016; Cohen et al. 2016; 
Maksymov et al. 2017) 
Documentation instructions 
should prompt auditors to 
"think broadly" about audit 
evidence. Focus on "why" vs. 
"how" (Rasso 2015) 
 
Guidance should emphasize 
attention to contradictory 
evidence or take a "negative" 
frame (Austin et al. 2016; 
Cohen et al. 2016; Maksymov 
et al. 2017) 
Management bias Estimates are susceptible to 
management bias (Bratten et al. 
2013; Griffith et al. 2015a) 
Auditors should be attentive to 
management bias (Bratten et al. 
2013; Griffith et al. 2015a) 
Auditors perceive more bias 
when portfolios have several 
small overstatements or 
overstatements represent a 
large percentage of book value 
(Emett et al. 2016) 
 
An imbalanced emphasis on 
bias decreases auditor 
sensitivity to measurement 
imprecision (Van Landuyt 
2017) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Environmental factors should 
place a more balanced 
emphasis on bias and 
imprecision (Van Landuyt 
2017) 
Auditor-Specific 
Factors 
    
Auditor knowledge 
and expertise 
See Estimation uncertainty 
above 
 
See Estimation uncertainty 
above 
 
  
Application of 
professional 
skepticism 
See Estimation uncertainty 
above 
 
See Estimation uncertainty 
above 
 
Deliberative, versus 
implemental, mindsets improve 
judgments and skepticism 
(Griffith et al. 2015b) 
 
See Task structure above 
Practitioners could employ 
interventions to promote 
deliberative mindsets (Griffith 
et al. 2015b). 
Cognitive 
limitations 
See Estimation uncertainty 
above 
See Estimation uncertainty 
above 
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Figure 2 
Manipulation of the Risk of Management Bias 
 
Panel A: Reporters’ additional compensation in the high risk of bias condition  
 
 Lowest Possible Estimate 
(Signal – 15) 
Highest Possible Estimate 
(Signal + 15) 
Reporter’s Additional 
Compensation: 
  
$0     increases by $0.50 per marble 
guessed 
$15 
 
 
Panel B: Reporters’ additional compensation in the low risk of bias condition 
 
 Fewest Possible  
Marbles in the Container 
(Signal – 15) 
 
Most Possible Marbles 
(Signal + 15) 
Reporter’s Additional 
Compensation: 
  
$0     increases by $0.50 per marble in the container  $15 
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Figure 3 
Experimental Timeline and Manipulation of Risk Emphasis 
 
Panel A: Experimental timeline 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1. Participants learn whether they have been randomly assigned to the role of 
Reporter (“Player A”) or Auditor (“Player B”). 
2. Participants work through common set of instructions with embedded 
comprehension checks. 
3. Participants are reminded of how the Reporter will be compensated in the 
first set of five rounds. 
 
Auditor makes risk assessment. 
 
4. and 7. Reporter views private signal and makes estimate. 
5. and 8. Auditor views estimate and selects level of costly audit effort. 
6. Auditor/Reporter pairings rotate and participants are reminded of how the 
Reporter will be compensated in the second set of five rounds. 
 
Auditor makes risk assessment. 
 
9. Participants complete post-experimental questionnaire. 
10. Outcomes are determined and revealed.  
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Figure 3, cont. 
Panel B: Wording used to convey to auditors an emphasis on management bias only 
  
At 1. (refer to Panel A) 
You are about to learn that in some rounds of the task, you will be paired with a Player A 
who has incentives to ignore the information that is available to him or her and, as a 
result, make choices that are likely to increase the chances that you get a low payoff. 
During other rounds, you will be paired with a Player A who does not have such 
incentives. 
 
At 3.* 
In this first set of five rounds the additional payment to Player A increases as the actual 
number of marbles in the container increases. 
 
Player A’s Incentives 
Because Player A’s guess does not impact Player A’s additional payment, but Player A’s 
Loss is based on the number of marbles by which his or her guess is “off”, Player A’s 
incentives are best served when he or she guesses a number that is close to the 
measurement provided by the scale. 
 
At 6.* 
In this second set of five rounds the additional payment to Player A increases as the 
number of marbles Player A guesses increases. 
 
Player A’s Incentives 
Because Player A can get a higher payment by guessing more marbles (and the amount of 
this additional payment is more than Player A’s possible Loss), Player A has an incentive 
to always guess more marbles than indicated by the measurement provided by the scale. 
 
*The order in which participants view the wording conveyed in 3. and 6. is counterbalanced between experimental 
sessions to match the counterbalanced order of the within-participant manipulation of management bias.   
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Figure 3, cont. 
Panel C: Wording used to convey to auditors an emphasis on management bias and 
measurement imprecision 
  
At 1. (refer to Panel A) 
You are about to learn that in some rounds of the task, you will be paired with a Player A 
who has incentives to ignore the information that is available to him or her and, as a 
result, make choices that are likely to increase the chances that you get a low payoff. 
During other rounds, you will be paired with a Player A who does not have such 
incentives. 
 
You will also learn that the information available to Player A is not very precise. Thus, 
regardless of Player A’s incentives, the result of Player A’s decisions in the experimental 
task might contribute to the possibility that you get a low payoff.     
 
At 3.* 
In this first set of five rounds the additional payment to Player A increases as the actual 
number of marbles in the container increases. 
 
Player A’s Incentives 
Because Player A’s guess does not impact Player A’s additional payment, but Player A’s 
Loss is based on the number of marbles by which his or her guess is “off”, Player A’s 
incentives are best served when he or she guesses a number that is close to the 
measurement provided by the scale. 
 
Imprecision of the Scale 
The fact that the scale used to weigh the marbles is imprecise contributes to the 
possibility that the measurement viewed by Player A, and ultimately his or her guess, 
might not be very close to the actual number of marbles in the container. 
 
At 6.* 
In this second set of five rounds the additional payment to Player A increases as the 
number of marbles Player A guesses increases. 
 
Player A’s Incentives 
Because Player A can get a higher payment by guessing more marbles (and the amount of 
this additional payment is more than Player A’s possible Loss), Player A has an incentive 
to always guess more marbles than indicated by the measurement provided by the scale. 
 
Imprecision of the Scale 
The fact that the scale used to weigh the marbles is imprecise contributes to the 
possibility that the measurement viewed by Player A, and ultimately his or her guess, 
might not be very close to the actual number of marbles in the container. 
 
*The order in which participants view the wording conveyed in 3. and 6. is counterbalanced between experimental 
sessions to match the counterbalanced order of the within-participant manipulation of management bias.  
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Figure 4 
Average Level of Costly Effort Selected by Auditors 
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Figure 5 
Reporter Estimates 
 
Panel A: Imprecise signals and reporter estimates by period 
 
 
Panel B: Reporter bias by period (mean estimates relative to a standardized signal)   
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TABLES 
Table 1 
Probabilities Associated with Chosen Level of Audit Effort 
 
Panel A: The impact of audit effort on the probability the auditor incurs a penalty 
Audit Effort P(Auditor Penalty)  
1 0.95  
2 0.80  
3 0.65  
4 0.55  
5 0.45  
6 0.35  
7 0.25  
8 0.15  
9 0.10  
10 0.05  
  
 
Panel B: The impact of audit effort on the probability the reporter incurs a penalty 
Audit Effort P(Reporter Penalty)  
1 0.05  
2 0.10  
3 0.15  
4 0.25  
5 0.35  
6 0.45  
7 0.55  
8 0.65  
9 0.80  
10 0.95  
  
64 
 
Table 2 
Manipulation Check: Emphasis on Bias versus Emphasis on Bias and Imprecision 
 
Panel A: Auditors’ mean (std. dev.) response to the post-experimental question, “In general, 
how much emphasis did the experimental materials place on the fact that Player A’s guess 
contributed to the amount of your potential loss?” 
 Bias Emphasis 
Dual 
Emphasis df t-statistic p-value 
 5.69 (1.09) 5.94 (1.00) 65 0.94 0.35 
 
 
Panel B: Auditors’ mean (std. dev.) response to the post-experimental question, “In general, 
how much emphasis did the experimental materials place on the fact that the imprecision of 
the scale contributed to the amount of your potential loss?” 
 Bias 
Emphasis 
Dual 
Emphasis 
df t-statistic p-value 
 4.47 (1.75) 5.32 (1.42) 65 2.16 0.02 
Responses measured on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 = “not emphasized” to 7 = “heavily emphasized.” 
Reported p-values are two-tailed with the exception of directional predictions which are one-tailed, as indicated by 
boldface.  
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Table 3 
Costly Audit Effort 
 
Panel A: Mean (std. dev.) level of costly effort selected by auditors  
 High Risk of Bias Low Risk of Bias  
Dual Emphasis 
n = 31 
5.59 
(1.96) 
4.50 
(2.34) 
 
 
Bias Emphasis 
n = 37 
5.82 
(1.86) 
3.71 
(1.64) 
 
 
 
Panel B: Repeated measures analysis of variance 
Source df M.S. F-Statistic p-value 
Between-Participants     
Emphasis 1 2.64 0.48    0.49 
Error 66 5.48   
Within-Participants      
Risk of Bias 1 86.28 41.02 < 0.01 
Risk of Bias × Emphasis 1 8.74 4.15    0.05 
Error 66 2.10   
 
 
Panel C: Simple effect of emphasis given the risk of reporter 
Effect of emphasis given: F-Statistic p-value 
High Risk of Bias 0.24 0.62 
Low Risk of Bias 2.65 0.05 
The within-participants dependent variables used in the analysis are auditors’ average chosen protection level, 
ranging from 1 to 10, over the five rounds comprising the high risk of bias condition and auditors’ average chosen 
protection level over the five comprising the low risk of bias condition. 
Risk of bias is manipulated within-participants by varying reporters’ additional compensation as shown in Figure 1. 
Emphasis is manipulated between-participants as shown in Figure 2. 
Reported p-values are two-tailed with the exception of directional predictions which are one-tailed, as indicated by 
boldface. 
  
66 
 
Table 4 
Auditors’ Risk Assessments  
 
Panel A: Auditors’ mean (std. dev.) risk assessments  
 High Risk of Bias Low Risk of Bias  
Dual Emphasis 
n = 31 
6.90 
(2.27) 
5.10 
(2.39) 
 
 
Bias Emphasis 
n = 37 
7.43 
(2.79) 
4.84 
(2.50) 
 
 
 
Panel B: Repeated measures analysis of variance 
Source df M.S. F-Statistic p-value 
Between-Participants     
Emphasis 1 0.62 0.07    0.80 
Error 66 9.07   
Within-Participants      
Risk of Bias 1 163.36 46.30 < 0.01 
Risk of Bias × Emphasis 1 5.24 1.49    0.23 
Error 66 2.10   
The within-participants dependent variables used in the analysis are auditors’ responses to the question “How 
concerned are you about the possibility that you will incur the Loss of up to $15 and, as a result, get a low payment 
for this set of five rounds?” Responses were measured prior to start of each set of five rounds, using an 11-point 
Likert scale anchored at 0 = “Not at all concerned” and 10 = “Very concerned.” 
Risk of bias is manipulated within-participants by varying reporters’ additional compensation as shown in Figure 1. 
Emphasis is manipulated between-participants as shown in Figure 2. 
Reported p-values are two-tailed.   
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Table 5 
Supplemental Analysis: Evidence of Systematic and Heuristic Processing 
 
Pearson correlations between auditors’ perceived impact of measurement imprecision on audit 
effort decisions and auditors’ actual level of audit effort.   
 Actual Audit Effort, High Risk of Bias 
Actual Audit Effort, 
Low Risk of Bias 
Perceived Impact of Imprecision on 
Audit Effort, Bias Emphasis 
 
0.06 
p = 0.74 
0.09 
p = 0.62 
Perceived Impact of Imprecision on 
Audit Effort, Dual Emphasis 
0.48 
p < 0.01 
0.49 
p < 0.01 
The variable “Actual Audit Effort” is auditors’ average chosen protection level, ranging from 1 to 10, over the five 
rounds comprising the high risk of bias condition and auditors’ average chosen protection level over the five 
comprising the low risk of bias condition. 
The variable “Perceived Impact of Imprecision on Audit Effort” represents auditors’ responses, measured on a 
seven-point scale anchored at 1 = “Strongly disagree” and 7 = “Strongly agree,” to the following statement: “The 
fact that the scale Player A used to estimate the number of marbles in the container was not very precise had a big 
impact on the Protection Level I chose.”   
Risk of bias is manipulated within-participants by varying reporters’ additional compensation as shown in Figure 1. 
Emphasis is manipulated between-participants as shown in Figure 2. 
Reported p-values are two-tailed.  
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Table 6 
Reporter Estimates 
 
Panel A: Mean (std. dev.) difference between reporter estimates and the imprecise signal 
 High Risk  of Bias 
Low Risk  
of Bias df t-statistic p-value 
Upward bias 8.55 (5.39) 1.84 (2.90) 21 5.86 < 0.01 
 
 
Panel B: One-sample t-test of the null hypothesis that the mean upward bias exhibited by 
reporters in the low risk of bias condition is equal to zero  
  Low Risk 
of Bias 
df t-statistic p-value 
Upward bias  1.84 (2.90) 21 2.97 < 0.01 
Reporters form an estimate based on observation of a randomly determined, imprecise signal. Estimates are 
constrained to be equal to the imprecise signal plus or minus 15. 
Risk of bias is manipulated within-participants by varying reporters’ additional compensation as shown in Figure 1. 
Reported p-values are two-tailed. 
  
69 
 
APPENDICES 
Appendix A 
Parameters and Equilibrium for Audit Game 
 
V = true asset value (unknown) 
S = reporter’s private signal = V + e, e ∈ U{-15, 15} 
G = reporter’s estimate, G ∈ {S – 15, S – 14, … , S + 14, S + 15)  
Reporter Penalty = f(|G – V|): 
if |G – V| ≤ 5, Reporter Penalty = $0 
if 5 < |G – V| < 10, Reporter Penalty = $|5 – (|G – V|)| 
if |G – V| ≥ 10, Reporter Penalty = $5 
P(Reporter Penalty) = see Table 1 Panel B 
Auditor Penalty = f(|G – V|): 
if |G – V| ≤ 5, Auditor Penalty = $0 
if 5 < |G – V| < 15, Auditor Penalty = $|G – V| 
if |G – V| ≥ 15, Auditor Penalty = $15  
P(Auditor Penalty) = see Table 1 Panel A 
Audit Effort ∈ {1, 2, … , 9, 10}  
c(Audit Effort) = Audit Effort × $0.50 
 
Reporter’s payoff (high risk of bias condition)  
= $5 + $0.5(G + 15 – S) – [P(Reporter Penalty) × Reporter Penalty] 
 
Reporter’s payoff (low risk of bias condition)  
= $5 + $0.5(S + 15 – V) – [P(Reporter Penalty) × Reporter Penalty] 
 
Auditor’s payoff (in all conditions)  
= $20 – c(Audit Effort) – [P(Auditor Penalty) × Auditor Penalty]  
 
In the high risk of bias condition, the reporter faces a trade-off between the benefit of increasing 
the second term in his/her payoff function (by choosing a high G) and the cost of increasing the 
expected penalty (which increases in expectation as G deviates from S). The marginal benefit of 
choosing a high G is greater than the marginal cost imposed by a larger expected penalty 
(regardless of the likelihood of penalty as determined by audit effort), thus a wealth-maximizing 
reporter will choose G* = S + 15 (the highest possible G). 
 
In the low risk of bias condition, the reporter maximizes expected utility by minimizing the 
expected amount of the Reporter Penalty. Because S is equal to V, in expectation, the expected 
amount of the Reporter Penalty is $0 when the reporter chooses G* = S.     
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The auditor faces a trade-off between the cost of Audit Effort and the corresponding benefit 
provided by a lower probability of incurring the Auditor Penalty. 
 
At equilibrium, in the high risk of bias condition, the expected amount of the Auditor Penalty is: 
  
f(|G* - V|) = f(|S + 15 – V|) = f(|V + e +15 – V|) = f(|e + 15|)  
 
 if |e + 15| ≤  5, Auditor Penalty = $0  
      if 5 < |e + 15| < 15, Auditor Penalty = $|e + 15| 
      if |e + 15| ≥ 15, Auditor Penalty = $15   
 
 E[Auditor Penalty]  
= [P(-15 ≤ e ≤ -10) × $0] + [P(-9 ≤ e ≤  0) × $E[|e + 15|, given -9 ≤ e ≤ 0]]  
+ [P(1 ≤ e ≤ 15) × $15] 
= [(6/31) × $0] + [(10/31) × $|-4.5 + 15|] + [(15/31) × $15] 
  = $0 + $3.39 + $7.26 
  = $10.65 
 
Evaluating the auditor’s payoff function using an expected Auditor Penalty of $10.65 shows that, 
given the possible levels of Auditor Effort and associated c(Audit Effort) and P(Auditor Penalty),  
the auditor, at equilibrium, maximizes expected payoff by choosing Auditor Effort* = 10.  
 
Recalculating the above based on actual reporter behavior and auditors’ average expectations of 
reporter behavior (G = 8.55 and G = 13.43, respectively) yields expected Auditor Penalties of 
$8.00 and $9.97, respectively. Evaluating the auditor’s payoff function using either of these 
expected Auditor Penalties shows that the auditor, in response to actual or expected reporter 
behavior, maximizes expected payoff by choosing Auditor Effort* = 8.    
 
 
At equilibrium, in the low risk of bias condition, the expected amount of the Auditor Penalty is: 
  
f(|G* - V|) = f(|S – V|) = f(|V + e – V|) = f(|e|) 
   
 if |e| ≤  5, Auditor Penalty = $0 
      if 5 < |e| ≤ 15, Auditor Penalty = $|e| 
      if |e| ≥ 15, Auditor Penalty = $15   
 
 E[Auditor Penalty] 
 = [P(-5 ≤ e ≤ 5) × $0] + [P(-15 ≤ e < -5) × $E[ |e|, given -15 ≤ e < -5]]  
+ [P(5 < e ≤ 15) × $E[ |e|, given 5 < e ≤ 15)]] 
        = [(11/31) × $0] + [(10/31) × $|-10.5|] + [(10/31) × $|10.5|] 
        = $0 + $3.39 + $3.39 
        = $6.78       
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Evaluating the auditor’s payoff function using an expected Auditor Penalty of $6.78 shows that, 
given the possible levels of Auditor Effort and associated c(Audit Effort) and P(Auditor Penalty),  
the auditor maximizes expected payoff by choosing Auditor Effort* = 8. 
 
Recalculating the above based on actual reporter behavior and auditors’ average expectations of 
reporter behavior (G = 1.84 and G = 1.06, respectively) yields expected Auditor Penalties of 
$6.96 and $6.94, respectively. Evaluating the auditor’s payoff function using either of these 
expected Auditor Penalties shows that the auditor, in response to actual or expected reporter 
behavior, maximizes expected payoff by choosing Auditor Effort* = 8.    
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Appendix B 
Participant Materials 
 
Note: Instructions provided to participants appear in Arial font. Explanatory headings appear in 
all capitals using bolded and underlined Times New Roman font. Explanatory commentary not 
appearing to participants appears in italicized Times New Roman font and is set off by brackets.   
 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
 
[Read aloud by the experimental administrator] 
Welcome and thank you for participating in this study! 
 
The experimental session will take about 60 minutes. Just for showing up today, you will 
receive $5, and you have the possibility to earn considerably more. All compensation 
described from this point forward is in addition to the $5 “show up fee.” 
 
There should be no talking during the session. Please refrain from any communication 
with your fellow participants. Also, please do not discuss the experiment with other 
students who might be participating in future sessions.   
 
The experiment will be conducted exactly in the manner described in these instructions, 
with no deception of any form. Although much of this experiment has been programmed 
on a computer, the computer program accurately reflects the instructions. 
 
A hard copy of the instructions is provided for your reference, but all the information that 
you will need to complete the experiment will be given through the computer program.  
 
You may now press begin on your computer screen and follow the on screen prompts. 
 
[Begin instructions and comprehension check questions administered through z-Tree. Individual 
screens presented on z-Tree are separated by “--“. This first screen contains wording that 
(along with PLAYER B’s RISK ASSESSMENT, shown below) is part of the between-participants 
manipulation of “Bias Emphasis” versus “Dual Emphasis.”]   
Role Assignment 
In today’s study, you will complete several rounds of an activity that involves input from 
you and another participant in this session.  
 
[Player A] 
You will assume the role of Player A, and will be paired with another participant who is 
in the role of Player B. 
 
The outcome of the experimental task (and, as a result, the amount of your payment 
today) depends not only on decisions you make, but also on decisions made by Player 
B, and luck. Therefore, it is important for you to pay attention to all of the instructions 
(not just the instructions that specifically relate to Player A).  
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[Player B, Bias Emphasis Condition] 
You will assume the role of Player B, and will be paired with another participant who is 
in the role of Player A. 
 
The outcome of the experimental task (and, as a result, the amount of your payment 
today) depends not only on decisions you make, but also on decisions made by Player 
A, and luck. Therefore, it is important for you to pay attention to all of the instructions 
(not just the instructions that specifically relate to Player B). 
 
In fact, you are about to learn that in some rounds of the task, you will be paired with a 
Player A who has incentives to ignore the information that is available to him or her and, 
as a result, make choices that are likely to increase the chances that you get a low 
payoff. During other rounds, you will be paired with a Player A who does not have such 
incentives.   
 
[Player B, Dual Emphasis Condition] 
You will assume the role of Player B, and will be paired with another participant who is 
in the role of Player A. 
 
The outcome of the experimental task (and, as a result, the amount of your payment 
today) depends not only on decisions you make, but also on decisions made by Player 
A, and luck. Therefore, it is important for you to pay attention to all of the instructions 
(not just the instructions that specifically relate to Player B). 
 
In fact, you are about to learn that in some rounds of the task, you will be paired with a 
Player A who has incentives to ignore the information that is available to him or her and, 
as a result, make choices that are likely to increase the chances that you get a lower 
payoff. During other rounds, you will be paired with a Player A who does not have such 
incentives.   
 
You will also learn that the information available to Player A is not very precise. Thus, 
regardless of Player A’s incentives, the result of Player A’s decisions in the 
experimental task might contribute to the possibility that you get a low payoff.     
 
-- 
 
Overview 
As mentioned on the previous screen, the experimental task involves decisions made in 
pairs with one Player A and one Player B. Each pair will repeat the activity described in 
these instructions for five rounds. Each individual round is independent from the other 
rounds, meaning that potential gains and losses do not carry over from round to round.  
 
Once you have finished the five rounds, you will be anonymously paired with a different 
person in this session for another five rounds. However, you will remain assigned to the 
same role (either Player A or Player B) for both sets of five rounds. 
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Besides being paired with a different person for the second set of five rounds, the way 
in which Player A is compensated will also change in the second set of five rounds. The 
way Player B’s compensation is determined will remain constant throughout the 
experiment. The instructions that follow will describe this in detail.  
 
The outcomes of one round from the first set of five rounds and one round from the 
second set of five rounds will be randomly selected to determine your payment. 
 
To summarize, you will complete ten rounds of the task that is about to be described: 
five rounds anonymously paired with one person, and five rounds anonymously paired 
with a different person. In addition to new pairings, the method used to determine Player 
A’s payment will differ between the first and second set of five rounds. However, you will 
remain assigned to the same role (either Player A or Player B) throughout the entire 
experiment.   
 
-- 
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Player A’s task 
Imagine a large container filled with marbles. (The experiment is programmed on a 
computer, but thinking about the task in these terms will help you to understand the 
instructions.)  
 
Player A’s job is to guess how many marbles are in the container. 
 
The container is sealed shut, so it is impossible to just count the marbles. Instead, to get 
an idea of how many marbles are in the container, Player A must use a scale to weigh 
the container. Assume that the container, itself, is weightless, and each marble weighs 
one ounce. Thus, for example, if the container (with marbles in it) weighs exactly 100 
ounces, there are 100 marbles in the container. 
 
Unfortunately, the scale used to weigh the marbles is not precise. When Player A 
weighs the marbles, the scale provides a measurement that is equal to the sum of the 
actual weight (which is equivalent to the actual number of marbles) and a random 
number that can be anything from -15 to +15. Thus, the measurement provided by the 
scale is within 15 ounces of the actual weight, but Player A will not know exactly how 
close the measurement is, or whether the measurement is higher or lower than the 
actual weight of the marbles.  
 
 
[Incorrect answers to comprehension check questions result in participants viewing remedial 
information before being given another attempt to answer the question(s). Participants must 
answer each comprehension check question correctly before they can continue with the 
instructions.] 
 
-- 
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Player A’s task, continued  
 
Once Player A has viewed the measurement provided by the scale, Player A makes a 
guess about the number of marbles in the container. 
 
Because the measurement given by the scale is within 15 ounces of the container’s 
actual weight, Player A can guess any number of marbles between the measurement 
given by the scale minus 15 and the measurement given by the scale plus 15.  
 
 
 
-- 
 
How Player A will be compensated in the first set of five rounds: [The order in which 
the instructions present Player A’s payment scheme is counter balanced to match experimental 
sessions where Player A is incentivized to exhibit bias in the first set of five rounds and is 
incentivized to be unbiased in the second set of five rounds] 
 
For making the guess, Player A will receive fixed pay of $5.00. Player A will also receive 
some additional compensation ranging between $0 and $15, as described below.  
 
In the first set of five rounds, Player A’s additional compensation is based on the actual 
number of marbles in the container. The higher the number marbles that are in the 
container, the more additional payment Player A will receive. This additional payment is 
not affected by how many marbles Player A guesses are in the container. 
 
Specifically, if the actual number of marbles in the container is equal to the 
measurement minus 15 (the lowest possible number of marbles in the container given 
the measurement observed), Player A’s additional payment will be $0. For each marble 
above this amount, Player A will receive an additional $0.50. This is illustrated by the 
following diagram: 
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-- 
 
How Player A will be compensated in the second set of five rounds: 
 
As before, Player A will receive fixed pay of $5.00 for making the guess. However, 
Player A’s additional compensation (which still ranges from $0 to $15) is determined in 
a different manner, as described below.  
 
In the second set of five rounds, Player A’s additional compensation is based on the 
guess that Player A makes. The higher Player A’s guess, the more additional payment 
Player A will receive. This additional payment is not affected by how many marbles are 
actually in the container. 
 
Specifically, if Player A’s guess is equal to the measurement minus 15 (the lowest 
possible guess Player A can make), Player A’s additional payment will be $0. For each 
marble Player A guesses above this lowest possible guess, Player A will receive an 
additional $0.50. This is illustrated by the following diagram: 
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-- 
 
Summary of Player A’s Compensation 
 
To summarize, Player A receives $5 and some additional payment. 
 
In the first set of five rounds, the additional payment increases as the number of 
marbles in the container increases. 
 
In the second set of five rounds, the additional payment increases as the number of 
marbles that Player A guesses increases.  
 
Additionally, depending on how far Player A’s guess is “off” from the actual number of 
marbles in the container, Player A might lose up to $5. How this loss (“Player A’s Loss”) 
is determined will be described later in these instructions. Next, let’s take a look at 
Player B’s Task and Compensation.     
 
-- 
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Player B’s Task and Possible Loss for Player B 
Player B is given fixed pay of $20. 
 
The accuracy of Player A’s guess determines the amount of a possible loss that Player 
B might incur.  
 
Specifically, the absolute value of the difference between Player A’s guess and the 
actual number of marbles in the container determines the amount, in U.S. Dollars, of a 
Loss that could apply to Player B (“Player B’s Loss”). 
 
However, if Player A’s guess is “off” by 5 marbles or less, Player B’s Loss is $0. Also, 
even if Player A’s guess is “off” by more than 15 marbles, Player B’s Loss will not 
exceed $15. Thus, Player B’s Loss can be anything between $0 and $15. 
 
In simple terms, the number of marbles that Player A’s guess is “off,” equals to the 
Dollar amount of Player B’s Loss. For example if Player A’s guess is “off” by 7 marbles 
in either direction, Player B faces a potential Loss of $7. However, the amount of the 
possible Loss for Player B will never be more than $15 (even if Player A’s guess is “off” 
by more than 15). And, if Player A’s guess is “off” by 5 marbles or less, the amount of 
Player B’s Loss will be $0. 
 
The key point to remember is that the closer Player A’s guess is to the actual number 
of marbles in the container, the lower the amount of the potential Loss for Player B will 
be.  
 
 
 
-- 
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Player B’s Task and Possible Loss for Player B, continued  
After viewing Player A’s guess, but not the measurement provided by the scale, Player 
B selects a Protection Level that ranges from 1 to 10. 
 
The Protection Level determines the likelihood that Player B will incur a Loss. Higher 
levels of Protection are more costly to Player B, but reduce the probability of Player B’s 
Loss.   
 
Specifically, Player B must pay $0.50 for each incremental level of protection. That is, 
Player B’s cost is equal to the Protection Level (1 through 10) times $0.50.  
 
  
 
-- 
 
How Player B’s choice of Protection Level also impacts Player A 
 
Just as Player A’s guess influences the amount of the Loss that Player B might incur, 
the level of Protection chosen by Player B also has an effect on Player A’s payment. 
 
Recall that Player A receives fixed pay of $5 and additional pay that can range from $0 
to $15 based on either the actual number of marbles in the container (during the first 
five rounds), or Player A’s guess (during the second five rounds).  
 
In addition to these amounts, Player A might also incur a Loss that ranges from $0 to $5 
(“Player A’s Loss”). How the amount of Player A’s Loss is determined will be described 
on the next screen.  
81 
 
 
The higher the Protection Level chosen by Player B, the higher the likelihood that 
Player A will incur Player A’s Loss. Player A’s Loss is completely separate from Player 
B’s Loss. The possible likelihoods of Player A’s Loss are shown in the table below (also 
provided in hard copy):  
 
 
-- 
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How Player B’s choice of Protection Level also impacts Player A, continued 
 
The amount of Player A’s loss increases by $1 (but does not exceed $5) for each 
marble that Player A’s guess is “off” in excess of 5 marbles. In other words, as long as 
Player A’s guess is within 5 marbles of the actual number of marbles in the container, 
Player A will incur no loss regardless of the Protection Level chosen by Player B. If 
Player A’s guess is “off” by more than 5, however, Player A might lose up to $5, as 
shown in the table below (also provided in hard copy): 
 
 
 
-- 
 
Summary of Payments to Player A and Player B  
[Again, the order in which the instructions present Player A’s payment scheme is counter-
balanced to match experimental sessions where Player A is incentivized to exhibit bias in the 
first set of five rounds and is incentivized to be unbiased in the second set of five rounds] 
 
Player A’s Payment in the first set of five rounds =  
Fixed Pay of $5 
plus  Additional payment between $0 and $15. The amount of additional 
payment increases as the actual number of marbles in the container 
increases.  
minus  Player A’s Loss (between $0 and $5), if applicable. 
 
Player A’s Payment in the second set of five rounds =  
Fixed Pay of $5  
plus Additional payment between $0 and $15. The amount of additional 
payment increases as Player A’s guess increases. 
minus  Player A’s Loss (between $0 and $5), if applicable.   
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Player B’s Payment =  
Fixed Pay $20  
minus the cost associated with the chosen Protection Level (between $0 and $5) 
. 
minus Player B’s Loss (between $0 and $15), if applicable. 
 
More information on the random process that will be used to determine whether or not 
each player’s Loss applies will be given later. 
 
-- 
 
Recap 
[Again, the order in which the instructions present Player A’s payment scheme will be counter-
balanced to match experimental sessions where Player A is incentivized to exhibit bias in the 
first set of five rounds and is incentivized to be unbiased in the second set of five rounds] 
 
To summarize, Player A views a measurement from an imprecise scale and then makes 
a guess about the number of marbles in the container. The measurement provided by 
the scale can be anything between the actual number of marbles in the container minus 
15 and the actual number of marbles plus 15. Player A can guess anything between the 
measurement minus 15 and the measurement plus 15. 
 
In the first set of five rounds, Player A receives more additional payment when more 
marbles are actually in the container. 
 
In the second set of five rounds, Player A can increase his or her additional payment by 
guessing a higher number of marbles.  
 
While the measurement provided by the scale can be “off” by as much as 15 marbles in 
either direction, guesses that are closer to the measurement tend to be closer to the 
actual number of marbles, on average.  
 
How far “off” Player A’s guess is from the actual number of marbles in the container 
determines the amount of a Loss that could apply to Player B (“Player B’s Loss”). The 
amount of Player B’s Loss ranges from $0 to $15. 
 
Player B chooses a Protection Level that determines the likelihood that Player B incurs 
Player B’s Loss. Higher levels of protection are more costly to Player B. 
 
Higher levels of protection also mean that Player A has a higher likelihood of incurring a 
separate Loss (“Player A’s Loss”) that ranges between $0 and $5 based on whether 
Player A’s guess is within 5 marbles of the actual number of marbles in the container.  
 
-- 
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Procedure 
Depending on the number of participants in this session, it’s possible that more than 
one Player B will be paired with a single Player A. From your perspective, this will not 
have any impact on how the experimental task proceeds. In fact, you won’t even know if 
this occurs. If multiple Player Bs are paired with a single Player A, the computer 
program will randomly select one of the Player Bs and use his or her chosen Protection 
Levels when determining that particular Player A’s final payment.     
 
As mentioned earlier, each pairing will repeat the described tasks for 5 rounds. 
However, you won’t find out the actual number of marbles in the container or whether 
you incur a Loss within each round until the end of the experiment. Again, each 
individual round is independent of the other rounds, meaning that potential gains and 
losses do not carry over from round to round.  
 
Once you have finished the first set of 5 rounds, you will be anonymously paired with a 
different person in the session for another 5 rounds. However, you will remain assigned 
to the same role (Player A or Player B) for both sets of five rounds. As described 
previously, the manner in which Player A is compensated will change during the second 
set of five rounds.    
 
In total, you will complete 10 rounds. The outcomes from one randomly selected round 
from the first set of 5 rounds and one randomly selected round from the second set of 5 
rounds will determine your payoff for the experiment. 
 
The selection of the rounds that will determine your payoff, as well as whether or not 
you will actually incur a Loss for each of those rounds, will be determined using random 
processes that will be explained later. The experimenter will assist you with these 
processes at the appropriate time. 
 
-- 
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-- 
 
Final Reminder 
[Player A is incentivized to be unbiased in the first set of five rounds] 
You have been assigned to the role of Player A. 
 
Your job each round is to guess the number of marbles in a container based on a 
measurement provided by an imprecise scale. 
 
During this first set of five rounds, you will be paid $5.00 for making the guess. 
 
Irrespective of the number of marbles you guess, you will receive an additional payment 
between $0 and $15 based on the actual number of marbles in the container. The more 
marbles that are in the container, the higher your additional payment will be. The 
additional payment depends only on the actual number of marbles in the container, not 
how many marbles you guess are in the container. 
 
You might lose up to $5 if the absolute value of the difference between your guess and 
the actual number of marbles in the container is greater than 5. The likelihood that you 
incur this Loss depends on the Protection Level chosen by Player B.  
 
[Player A is incentivized to exhibit bias in the first set of five rounds] 
You have been assigned to the role of Player A. 
 
Your job each round is to guess the number of marbles in a container based on a 
measurement provided by an imprecise scale. 
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During this first set of five rounds, you will be paid $5.00 for making the guess. 
 
Irrespective of the actual number of marbles in the container, you will receive an 
additional payment between $0 and $15 based on the number of marbles you guess. 
The more marbles that you guess, the higher your additional payment will be. The 
additional payment depends only on the number of marbles you guess are in the 
container, not the actual number of marbles in the container. 
 
You might lose up to $5 if the absolute value of the difference between your guess and 
the actual number of marbles in the container is greater than 5. The likelihood that you 
incur this Loss depends on the Protection Level chosen by Player B.  
 
[Player B] 
You have been assigned to the role of Player B. 
 
Player A’s job is to guess the number of marbles in a container based on a 
measurement provided by an imprecise scale. As the number of marbles by which 
Player A’s guess is “off” increases, the amount of your potential Loss increases (up to a 
maximum Loss of $15). 
 
[Player B paired with unbiased Player A for the first set of five rounds] 
For this first set of five rounds, in addition to a fixed payment, Player A receives an 
additional payment that increases as the actual number of marbles in the container 
increases. Unlike in later rounds, Player A cannot increase his or her additional 
payment by making a higher guess.   
 
[Player B paired with biased Player A for the first set of five rounds] 
For this first set of five rounds, in addition to a fixed payment, Player A increases his or 
her additional payment by guessing a higher number of marbles. Unlike in later rounds, 
this additional payment to Player A is not influenced by the actual number of marbles in 
the container.  
 
[All Player Bs] 
You will start with $20 and, after viewing Player A’s guess, will choose a Protection 
Level between 1 and 10. Protection Level 1 will cost you $0.50 and you must pay an 
additional $0.50 for each additional level of Protection. 
 
The higher the Protection Level, the lower the chance that you will incur the Loss (up to 
$15) determined by the absolute difference between Player A’s guess and the actual 
number of marbles in the container.   
 
Higher levels of Protection also increase Player A’s chance of losing up to $5 if the 
absolute value of the difference between Player A’s guess and the actual number of 
marbles in the container is greater than 5. 
--  
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PLAYER A’s ESTIMATE 
[The below is an example of the screen at which Player A enters his/her estimate for each of the 
10 experimental rounds (2 sets of 5 rounds)] 
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PLAYER B’s RISK ASSESSMENT (AND PRIMARY MANIPULATION OF EMPHASIS)  
[The following contains wording that (along with the first screen at the beginning of the 
instructions) is part of the between-participants manipulation of Bias Emphasis versus Dual 
Emphasis. The screens below are presented to Player B at the beginning of each five-round 
period. Again, references to Player A’s compensation scheme (manipulated within-participants) 
are counterbalanced.] 
 
[Bias Emphasis] 
In this first set of five rounds the additional payment to Player A increases as the actual 
number of marbles in the container increases. 
 
Player A’s Incentives 
Because Player A’s guess does not impact Player A’s additional payment, but Player 
A’s Loss is based on the number of marbles by which his or her guess is “off”, Player 
A’s incentives are best served when he or she guesses a number that is close to the 
measurement provided by the scale. 
 
How concerned are you about the possibility that you will incur the Loss of up to $15 
and, as a result, get a low payment for this set of five rounds? 
 
 
-- 
[PLAYER B’s SELECTION OF COSTLY EFFORT and SCREENS DISPLAYED AFTER COMPLETION 
OF FIRST SET OF FIVE ROUNDS, shown below, appear here] 
-- 
 
In this second set of five rounds the additional payment to Player A increases as the 
number of marbles Player A guesses increases. 
 
Player A’s Incentives 
Because Player A can get a higher payment by guessing more marbles (and the 
amount of this additional payment is more than Player A’s possible Loss), Player A has 
an incentive to always guess more marbles than indicated by the measurement 
provided by the scale. 
 
How concerned are you about the possibility that you will incur the Loss of up to $15 
and, as a result, get a low payment for this set of five rounds? 
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[Dual Emphasis] 
In this first set of five rounds the additional payment to Player A increases as the actual 
number of marbles in the container increases. 
 
Player A’s Incentives 
Because Player A’s guess does not impact Player A’s additional payment, but Player 
A’s Loss is based on the number of marbles by which his or her guess is “off”, Player 
A’s incentives are best served when he or she guesses a number that is close to the 
measurement provided by the scale. 
 
Imprecision of the Scale 
The fact that the scale used to weigh the marbles is imprecise contributes to the 
possibility that the measurement viewed by Player A, and ultimately his or her guess, 
might not be very close to the actual number of marbles in the container. 
 
How concerned are you about the possibility that you will incur the Loss of up to $15 
and, as a result, get a low payment for this set of five rounds? 
 
 
 
-- 
[PLAYER B’s SELECTION OF COSTLY EFFORT and SCREENS DISPLAYED AFTER COMPLETION 
OF FIRST SET OF FIVE ROUNDS, shown below, appear here] 
-- 
In this second set of five rounds the additional payment to Player A increases as the 
number of marbles Player A guesses increases. 
 
Player A’s Incentives 
Because Player A can get a higher payment by guessing more marbles (and the 
amount of this additional payment is more than Player A’s possible Loss), Player A has 
an incentive to always guess more marbles than indicated by the measurement 
provided by the scale. 
 
Imprecision of the Scale 
The fact that the scale used to weigh the marbles is imprecise contributes to the 
possibility that the measurement viewed by Player A, and ultimately his or her guess, 
might not be very close to the actual number of marbles in the container. 
 
How concerned are you about the possibility that you will incur the Loss of up to $15 
and, as a result, get a low payment for this set of five rounds? 
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PLAYER B’s SELECTION OF COSTLY AUDIT EFFORT 
[The below is an example of the screen at which Player B views Player A’s estimate and selects 
a level of costly audit effort for each of the 10 experimental rounds (2 sets of 5 rounds)] 
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SCREENS DISPLAYED AFTER COMPLETION OF FIRST SET OF FIVE ROUNDS 
[After the first five rounds participants are shuffled into new anonymous pairings and Player A’s 
compensation scheme changes. To reiterate, “risk of management bias” is a (counterbalanced) 
within-participants manipulation. These screens are meant to remind participants of the change 
in Player A’s compensation scheme. For Player B, the relevant screen below appears prior to 
the Risk Assessment screen shown above for the second set of five rounds.]   
 
[Player A was incentivized to be unbiased in the first set of five rounds] 
You have just completed the first set of five rounds.  
 
For this second set of five rounds, you will be randomly paired with a different person 
who is in the role of Player B. 
 
Also remember that for the next five rounds you will be compensated in a manner that is 
different from the way you were paid in the first five rounds. 
 
Now the additional payment that you receive does not depend on the actual number of 
marbles in the container. Instead, during the next five rounds, your additional 
payment will increase as the number of marbles that you guess increases. 
 
To review, beyond the fixed payment of $5.00, if your guess is equal to the 
measurement provided by the scale minus 15 (the lowest possible guess you can 
make), your additional payment will be $0. For each marble you guess above this 
lowest possible guess, you will receive an additional $0.50. This is illustrated by the 
following diagram: 
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[Player A was incentivized to be biased in the first set of five rounds] 
You have just completed five rounds.  
 
For this second set of five rounds, you will be randomly paired with a different person 
who is in the role of Player B. 
 
Also remember that for the next five rounds you will be compensated in a manner that is 
different from the way you were paid in the first five rounds. 
 
 
Now the additional payment that you receive does not depend on the number of 
marbles that you guess. Instead, during the next five rounds, your additional 
payment will be based on the actual number of marbles in the container.  
 
To review, beyond the fixed payment of $5.00, if the actual number of marbles in the 
container is equal to the measurement minus 15 (the lowest possible number of 
marbles in the container given the measurement observed), Player A’s additional 
payment will be $0. For each marble above this amount, Player A will receive an 
additional $0.50. This is illustrated by the following diagram: 
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[Player B was paired with an unbiased Player A in the first set of five rounds] 
You have just completed five rounds.  
 
For this second set of five rounds, you will be randomly paired with a different person 
who is in the role of Player A. 
 
Also remember that this new Player A for the next five rounds is compensated in a 
manner that is different from the way Player A was paid in the first five rounds. 
 
Now the additional payment that Player A receives does not depend on the actual 
number of marbles in the container. Instead, during the next five rounds, Player A’s 
additional payment will increase as the number of marbles that Player A guesses 
increases. 
 
To review, beyond the fixed payment of $5.00, if Player A’s guess is equal to the 
measurement provided by the scale minus 15 (the lowest possible guess Player A can 
make), Player A’s additional payment will be $0. For each marble Player A guesses 
above this lowest possible guess, Player A will receive an additional $0.50. This is 
illustrated by the following diagram: 
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[Player B was paired with a biased Player A in the first set of five rounds] 
You have just completed five rounds.  
 
For this second set of five rounds, you will be randomly paired with a different person 
who is in the role of Player A. 
 
Also remember that this new Player A for the next five rounds is compensated in a 
manner that is different from the way Player A was paid in the first five rounds. 
 
Now the additional payment that Player A receives does not depend on the number of 
marbles that Player A guesses. Instead, during the next five rounds, Player A’s 
additional payment will be based on the actual number of marbles in the 
container.  
 
To review, beyond the fixed payment of $5.00, if the actual number of marbles in the 
container is equal to the measurement minus 15 (the lowest possible number of 
marbles in the container given the measurement observed), Player A’s additional 
payment will be $0. For each marble above this amount, Player A will receive an 
additional $0.50. This is illustrated by the following diagram: 
 
 
 
-- 
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PROMPT FOR POST-EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE  
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PLAYER A’s POST-EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE 
[PEQ distributed and completed in hard copy] 
Please answer the following questions.  
 
You just completed two sets of five rounds. In each set of five rounds you received 
different payments for guessing the number of marbles.  
 
How were you compensated in the first set of five rounds? 
 
a. Fixed pay of $5.00, with an additional payment that increased as the actual 
number of marbles in the container increased. 
 
b. Fixed pay of $5.00, with an additional payment that increased as the number 
of marbles you guessed increased.  
 
How were you compensated in the second set of five rounds? 
 
a. Fixed pay of $5.00, with an additional payment that increased as the actual 
number of marbles in the container increased. 
 
b. Fixed pay of $5.00, with an additional payment that increased as the number 
of marbles you guessed increased.  
 
 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
 
When guessing the number of marbles, I always guessed exactly the number of 
marbles that I thought were in the container.  
During the first set of five rounds: 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
During the second set of five rounds: 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
  
Strongly 
disagree 
Strongly  
agree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Strongly  
agree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
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When guessing the number of marbles, I thought it was best to just always guess a 
number equal to the measurement provide by the scale. 
During the first set of five rounds: 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
During the second set of five rounds: 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
I thought that the further my guess was from the measurement provided by the scale, 
the more likely it was that Player B’s Loss would be higher and I might lose up to $5. 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
I was concerned about the possibility that my guess would have negative consequences 
for Player B. 
During the first set of five rounds: 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
During the second set of five rounds: 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
I wanted to maximize my payoff, regardless of what it meant for Player B. 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
  
Strongly 
disagree 
Strongly  
agree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Strongly  
agree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Strongly  
agree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Strongly  
agree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Strongly  
agree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Strongly  
agree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
98 
 
I thought Player B was likely to choose a Protection Level that would minimize Player 
B’s chance of incurring a Loss, regardless of what it meant for me. 
During the first set of five rounds: 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
During the second set of five rounds: 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
I put a high amount of effort into understanding the instructions and carefully thinking 
about my decisions.  
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
I enjoyed participating in this activity and found it interesting. 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
  
Strongly 
disagree 
Strongly  
agree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Strongly  
agree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Strongly  
agree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Strongly  
agree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
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On average, what Protection Level (1 to 10) do you think Player B chose during the first 
set of five rounds? 
   _____ 
 
On average, what Protection Level (1 to 10) do you think Player B chose during the 
second set of five rounds? 
    _____ 
 
 
How willing are you to take risks, in general? 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
Please indicate on the scale below which is most important to you: 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: All else equal, I 
tend to avoid situations where the outcome is uncertain. 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
Hypothetically, how much would you be willing to pay for a lottery ticket that gives you a 
50% chance of winning $100 (and a 50% chance of winning nothing)? 
     
$_________  
 
 
Assume that you have up to $10,000 to invest in a stock that has a 50% chance of 
doubling your investment and a 50% chance of returning only half of your investment. 
How much (any amount between $0 and $10,000) would you be willing to invest in such 
a stock? 
 
$_________ 
 
 
  
Not at all  
willing 
Very willing Neither willing 
nor unwilling 
Avoiding Negative  
Outcomes 
Getting positive 
outcomes 
Both are equally 
important 
Strongly 
disagree 
Strongly  
agree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
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A few more questions to help us understand the decisions you made today… 
 
Imagine that we rolled a fair, six-sided die 1,000 times. Out of 1,000 rolls, how many 
times do you think the die would come up even (that is, come up showing 2, 4, or 6)? 
        
______ 
 
 
In the BIG BUCKS LOTTERY, the chances of winning a $10.00 prize is 1%. What is 
your best guess about how many people would win a $10.00 prize if 1,000 people each 
buy a single ticket to BIG BUCKS? 
 
______ 
 
 
In the ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES, the chance of winning a car is 1 in 1,000. 
What percent of tickets to ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES win a car? 
 
______ 
 
 
What is your gender (circle one)? 
 
 Male   Female 
 
 
 
What is your major? _________________ 
 
    
 
What is your class level (i.e., Freshman, Sophomore, Junior, or Senior)? ____________   
 
 
 
What is your age? _____ 
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire! Now that you have 
finished, please raise your hand for the experimenter to come and assist you with 
the final steps necessary to determine your payment. 
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PLAYER B’s POST-EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE 
[PEQ distributed and completed in hard copy] 
Please answer the following questions.  
 
You just completed two sets of five rounds. In each set of five rounds you were paired 
with a participant in the Player A role who received different payments for guessing the 
number of marbles.  
 
How was Player A compensated in the first set of five rounds? 
 
c. Fixed pay of $5.00, with an additional payment that increased as the actual 
number of marbles in the container increased. 
 
d. Fixed pay of $5.00, with an additional payment that increased as the number 
of marbles Player A guessed increased.  
 
How was Player A compensated in the second set of five rounds? 
 
a. Fixed pay of $5.00, with an additional payment that increased as the actual 
number of marbles in the container increased. 
 
b. Fixed pay of $5.00, with an additional payment that increased as the number 
of marbles Player A guessed increased.  
 
 
In general, how much emphasis did the experimental materials place on the fact that 
Player A’s guess contributed to the amount of your potential loss?  
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
In general, how much emphasis did the experimental materials place on the fact that the 
imprecision of the scale contributed to the amount of your potential loss?  
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
True or False: The measurement provided by the scale could be “off” by up to 15 
marbles in either direction. 
 
a. True 
 
b. False 
Not  
emphasized 
Heavily 
emphasized 
Not  
emphasized 
 
Heavily 
emphasized 
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To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
 
I thought the amount of the Loss I might incur was likely to be larger when Player A’s 
additional payment increased as the number of marbles Player A guessed increased.  
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
The way Player A was compensated had a big impact on the Protection Level I chose. 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
The fact that the scale Player A used to estimate the number of marbles in the container 
was not very precise had a big impact on the Protection Level I chose. 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
I was concerned about the possibility that the Protection Level I chose would have 
negative consequences for Player A. 
During the first set of five rounds: 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
During the second set of five rounds: 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
  
Strongly 
disagree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Strongly  
agree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Strongly  
agree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Strongly  
agree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Strongly  
agree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Strongly  
agree 
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I wanted to maximize my payment, regardless of what it meant for Player A.  
During the first set of five rounds: 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
During the second set of five rounds: 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
I put a high amount of effort into understanding the instructions and carefully thinking 
about my decisions.  
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
I enjoyed participating in this activity and found it interesting. 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
  
Strongly 
disagree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Strongly  
agree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Strongly  
agree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Strongly  
agree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Strongly  
agree 
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Assume that Player A saw the following measurement from the scale used to weigh the 
container full of marbles: 50 
If Player A’s additional payments were based on the actual number of marbles in 
the container, how many marbles, on average, do you think Player A would 
guess? 
    _____ 
 
If Player A’s additional payments increased as the number of marbles Player A 
guessed increased, how many marbles, on average, do you think Player A would 
guess? 
   _____ 
 
 
How willing are you to take risks, in general? 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
Please indicate on the scale below which is most important to you: 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: All else equal, I 
tend to avoid situations where the outcome is uncertain. 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
Hypothetically, how much would you be willing to pay for a lottery ticket that gives you a 
50% chance of winning $100 (and a 50% chance of winning nothing)? 
     
$_________  
 
Assume that you have up to $10,000 to invest in a stock that has a 50% chance of 
doubling your investment and a 50% chance of returning only half of your investment. 
How much (any amount between $0 and $10,000) would you be willing to invest in such 
a stock? 
 
$_________ 
 
  
Avoiding Negative  
Outcomes 
Both are equally 
important 
Getting positive 
outcomes 
Not at all  
willing 
Neither willing 
nor unwilling 
Very willing 
Strongly 
disagree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Strongly  
agree 
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A few more questions to help us understand the decisions you made today… 
 
Imagine that we rolled a fair, six-sided die 1,000 times. Out of 1,000 rolls, how many 
times do you think the die would come up even (that is, come up showing 2, 4, or 6)? 
        
______ 
 
 
In the BIG BUCKS LOTTERY, the chances of winning a $10.00 prize is 1%. What is 
your best guess about how many people would win a $10.00 prize if 1,000 people each 
buy a single ticket to BIG BUCKS? 
 
______ 
 
 
In the ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES, the chance of winning a car is 1 in 1,000. 
What percent of tickets to ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES win a car? 
 
______ 
 
 
What is your gender (circle one)? 
 
 Male   Female 
 
 
 
What is your major? _________________ 
 
    
 
What is your class level (i.e., Freshman, Sophomore, Junior, or Senior)? ____________   
 
 
 
What is your age? _____ 
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Statements that people use to describe themselves are given below. Please circle the 
response that indicates how you generally feel. There are no right or wrong answers. 
Do not spend too much time on any one statement.  
 
  Strongly 
Disagree 
    Strongly 
Agree 
 
I often accept other people’s 
explanations without further 
thought. 
 
  
     1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
    6 
I feel good about myself.  
 
      1 2 3 4 5     6 
I wait to decide on issues until I 
can get more information. 
 
      1 2 3 4 5     6 
The prospect of learning excites 
me. 
 
      1 2 3 4 5     6 
I am interested in what causes 
people to behave the way that 
they do. 
 
      1 2 3 4 5     6 
I am confident of my abilities.  
 
      1 2 3 4 5     6 
I often reject statements unless 
I have proof that they are true. 
 
      1 2 3 4 5     6 
Discovering new information is 
fun. 
 
      1 2 3 4 5     6 
I take my time when making 
decisions. 
 
      1 2 3 4 5     6 
I tend to immediately accept 
what other people tell me. 
 
      1 2 3 4 5     6 
Other people’s behavior does 
not interest me. 
 
      1 2 3 4 5     6 
I am self-assured.  
 
      1 2 3 4 5     6 
My friends tell me that I usually 
question things that I see or 
hear. 
 
      1 2 3 4 5     6 
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  Strongly 
Disagree 
    Strongly 
Agree 
 
I like to understand the reason 
for other people’s behavior. 
 
  
     1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
    6 
I think that learning is exciting. 
 
      1 2 3 4 5     6 
I usually accept things I see, 
read, or hear at face value. 
 
      1 2 3 4 5     6 
I do not feel sure of myself. 
 
      1 2 3 4 5     6 
I usually notice inconsistencies 
in explanations. 
 
      1 2 3 4 5     6 
Most often I agree with what the 
others in my group think. 
 
      1 2 3 4 5     6 
I dislike having to make 
decisions quickly. 
 
      1 2 3 4 5     6 
I have confidence in myself.  
 
      1 2 3 4 5     6 
I do not like to decide until I’ve 
looked at all of the readily 
available information. 
 
      1 2 3 4 5     6 
I like searching for knowledge.  
 
      1 2 3 4 5     6 
I frequently question things that 
I see or hear. 
 
      1 2 3 4 5     6 
It is easy for other people to 
convince me. 
 
      1 2 3 4 5     6 
I seldom consider why people 
behave in a certain way. 
 
      1 2 3 4 5     6 
I like to ensure that I’ve 
considered most available 
information before making a 
decision. 
 
      1 2 3 4 5     6 
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  Strongly 
Disagree 
    Strongly 
Agree 
 
I enjoy trying to determine if 
what I read or hear is true. 
 
  
     1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
    6 
I relish learning.  
 
      1 2 3 4 5     6 
The actions people take and 
the reasons for those actions 
are fascinating. 
 
      1 2 3 4 5     6 
 
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire! Now that you have 
finished, please raise your hand for the experimenter to come and assist you with 
the final steps necessary to determine your payment.    
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DETERMINATION OF PROBABILISTIC OUTCOMES 
[At this point, the experimenter assisted each individual participant with determining 
probabilistic outcomes, as described below, and entering the appropriate input.] 
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EXAMPLE PAYOFF SCREEN FOR PLAYER A 
 
 
  
111 
 
EXAMPLE PAYOFF SCREEN FOR PLAYER B 
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